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IN THE BOX: VOIR DIRE ON LGBT ISSUES IN
CHANGING TIMES
GIOVANNA SHAY*
This is the first law review article to examine transcripts, court
filings, and published opinions about jury voir dire on attitudes
toward same-sex sexuality and LGBT issues. It demonstrates that
jurors express a range of homonegative attitudes. Many jurors
voicing such beliefs are not removed for cause, even in cases in-
volving lesbian and gay people and issues. It suggests some best
practices for voir dire to uncover attitudes toward same-sex sexu-
ality, based on social science research. Voir dire on LGBT issues
is likely to become more important in coming years. Despite enor-
mous gains, including historic marriage equality decisions,1 the
LGBT rights movement remains a cultural flashpoint. In part due
to the work of LGBT advocates, more cases involving LGBT issues
and sexuality are likely to enter the criminal legal system. These
could involve alleged harassment or bullying, like the Dharun
Ravi case, or hate crimes against LGBT people, which may be on
the rise even as LGBT rights advance.2 As stigma lessens and
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1 See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013); Hollingsworth v.
Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2659, 2668 (2013).
2 See John Leland, ‘It Was Like I Was by Myself:’ Gay People in Bronx Seek a Place
to Be Themselves, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/28/nyre-
gion/gay-people-in-bronx-seek-a-place-to-be-themselves.html, archived at http://perma.
cc/B9KR-L36P (discussing the reopening of the Bronx gay and lesbian center and report-
ing that “[t]he police recorded seven bias crimes against gay people in the Bronx this
year [2013] through July 14, up from one such crime in 2012 in the same period. City-
wide, the number of attacks recorded during that period rose to 59 from 28.”); Vijai
Singh, A Killing in Greenwich Village: As Gay Rights Increase, So Do Hate Crimes, N.Y.
TIMES (May 21, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/video/nyregion/100000002236382/a-
murder-in-greenwich-village.html, archived at http://perma.cc/7ZBL-CNE8 (conducting
a video interview of Sharon Stapel of the N.Y.C. Anti-Violence Project, who describes a
rise in anti-gay attacks in N.Y.C. over the past few years as a part of a “backlash” against
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more complainants come forward, there also may be more claims
of same-sex sexual assault or intimate partner violence. In many of
these cases, defense attorneys or prosecutors will seek to voir dire
jurors regarding their attitudes toward LGBT people and sexual-
ity. At the same time, LGBT venirepersons may fear discrimination
in voir dire. In 1998, Paul Lynd wrote that prospective jurors who
revealed that they were gay faced employment discrimination or
even criminal prosecution under then-extant sodomy laws.3 Today,
Lawrence v. Texas has largely eliminated criminal stigma,4 and
some jurisdictions have LGBT anti-discrimination protections.
Nonetheless, depending on the jurisdiction and the context, pro-
spective gay jurors might still fear public “outing,” and only a few
jurisdictions protect jurors from peremptory strikes based on sex-
ual orientation. This paper examines the complex and varying situ-
ations in which LGBT issues may surface in voir dire and offers
suggestions for navigating this contested terrain.
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 408 R
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INTRODUCTION
From late February through early March 2012, Dharun Ravi was tried
in Middlesex County, New Jersey on charges including invasion of privacy
and bias intimidation.5 As has been widely publicized, the state alleged that
Ravi used a computer webcam to view his Rutgers roommate Tyler Cle-
gay rights); see also JOEY L. MOGUL ET AL., QUEER (IN)JUSTICE: THE CRIMINALIZATION
OF LGBT PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES 126 (2011) (describing the spike in anti-gay
violence in California during the Yes on Proposition 8 campaign).
3 Paul R. Lynd, Comment, Juror Sexual Orientation: The Fair Cross-Section Re-
quirement, Privacy, Challenges for Cause & Peremptories, 46 UCLA L. REV. 231, 269
(1998).
4 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003).
5 See Richard Pérez-Peña, Rutgers Dorm Spying Trial Begins with Questions of Moti-
vation, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/25/nyregion/in-
tyler-clementi-trial-looking-at-dharun-ravis-intentions.html, archived http://perma.cc/H4
XD-6EP4; Kate Zernike, Jury Finds Spying in Rutgers Dorm Was a Hate Crime, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 16, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/17/nyregion/defendant-guilty-
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menti’s encounter with another man, and then posted on Twitter, encouraging
others to spy on Clementi and his date.6 Tragically, Clementi committed sui-
cide in the aftermath of the incident.7 In an effort to empanel a fair jury,
Middlesex County prosecutors and Ravi’s defense attorney agreed on ques-
tions to ask prospective jurors, including queries designed to uncover
homophobia.8 One question was, “Do you have any particular views on les-
bian, gay, homosexual, and/or bisexual issues (e.g. Don’t Ask Don’t Tell, gay
marriage, etc.)? If yes, please explain.”9 In May 2012, a couple of months
after Ravi’s trial ended in a conviction,10 President Barack Obama—who had
long stated that his own views on same-sex marriage were “evolving”—
announced his support for marriage equality for the first time.11 Thus, the
Ravi case, viewed by many as a cutting-edge prosecution designed to end
bullying of LGBT youth,12 also was notable because its voir dire of prospec-
tive jurors essentially tracked ongoing national debates about LGBT issues.
This Article examines the complexities of questioning prospective jurors
about their views on LGBT issues in a time of rapid social change,13 and
makes suggestions for best practices based on social science research.
In the coming years, LGBT people and relationships likely will con-
tinue to become more visible in courts across the nation.14 Bias prosecutions
like the Ravi case will reoccur, as will (sadly) cases involving even more
serious anti-LGBT hate crimes,15 such as the 2011 prosecution of Ventura
in-rutgers-case.html, archived at http://perma.cc/6V29-GM83 [hereinafter Zernike, Spy-
ing in Rutgers Dorm Was a Hate Crime].
6 Pérez-Peña, supra note 5. R
7 Lisa W. Foderaro, Private Moment Made Public, Then a Fatal Jump, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 29, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/30/nyregion/30suicide.html, archived
at http://perma.cc/4UV2-DBLM.
8 Telephone Interview with Julia McClure and Christopher Schellhorn, Assistant
Prosecutors, Middlesex County Prosecutor’s Office (Sept. 11, 2012); Telephone Interview
with Steven D.  Altman, Attorney, Benedict & Altman, (Sept. 11, 2012).
9 Email from Christopher Schellhorn, Assistant Prosecutor, Middlesex County Prose-
cutor’s Office, to author (Sept. 11, 2012, 12:29 PM EST) (on file with author).
10 Zernike, Spying in Rutgers Dorm Was a Hate Crime, supra note 5. R
11 Jackie Calmes & Peter Baker, Obama Says Same-Sex Marriage Should Be Legal,
N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/10/us/politics/obama-says-
same-sex-marriage-should-be-legal.html, archived at http://perma.cc/FB22-XLCP.
12 Zernike, Spying in Rutgers Dorm Was a Hate Crime, supra note 5 (quoting Steven R
Goldstein, chairman of Garden State Equality, as saying, “This verdict sends the impor-
tant message that a ‘kids will be kids’ defense is no excuse to bully another student.”).
13 Cf. Anthony Michael Kreis, Lawrence Meets Libel: Squaring Constitutional
Norms with Sexual-Orientation Defamation, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 125, 125, 133, 140
(2012), archived at http://perma.cc/J8WV-TUDP (describing “staggering inconsistency
in courts’ treatment of sexual-orientation defamation claims,” as well as the “anachronis-
tic” application of sexual-orientation defamation claims “[i]n an age when civil equality
for LGBT people is rapidly accelerating”).
14 See Giovanna Shay & J. Kelly Strader, Queer (In)Justice: Mapping New Gay
(Scholarly) Agendas, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 171, 172 (2012) (reviewing MO-
GUL ET AL., supra note 2). R
15 See MOGUL ET AL., supra note 2, at 126; see also Marc Santora & Joseph Gold- R
stein, In Shadow of the Stonewall Inn, a Gay Man is Killed, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/19/nyregion/killing-in-greenwich-village-looks-like-
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County, California teen Brendan McInerney for the shooting of his junior
high classmate, Lawrence King.16 As awareness of intimate partner violence
in LGBT relationships increases,17 more domestic violence cases involving
same-sex couples will enter the courts. Reduced stigma associated with
same-sex sexual contact may result in greater numbers of male rape survi-
vors coming forward with complaints.18 In all of these situations—and
more—prosecutors and defense attorneys will seek to ensure a fair jury by
asking voir dire questions about LGBT issues and sexuality.19
While LGBT people may figure as criminal defendants and victims in
these cases,20 they also appear as prospective jurors. In 1998, Paul Lynd
warned that voir dire—even the routine variety that asks about friends and
family—could risk “outing” some gay jurors, who at that time had good
reason to fear discrimination.21 Today, the U.S. Supreme Court has invali-
dated a portion of the Defense of Marriage Act of 1996 (DOMA),22 and
seventeen states and the District of Columbia recognize same-sex marriage.23
hate-crime-police-say.html, archived at http://perma.cc/NUR8-MEAS; Adam Sege &
Rex W. Huppke, Hate Crime Draws Attention to Violence Against Lesbians, Gays, CHI.
TRIB. (July 12, 2013), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-07-12/news/ct-met-hate-
crime-charge-20130712_1_hate-crime-second-man-23-year-old-woman, archived at
http://perma.cc/67RY-HJSF.
16 David Alan Perkiss, A New Strategy for Neutralizing the Gay Panic Defense at
Trial: Lessons from the Lawrence King Case, 60 UCLA L. REV. 778, 782, 788–89
(2013).
17 See NAT’L COAL. OF ANTI-VIOLENCE PROGRAMS, LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL,
TRANSGENDER, QUEER AND HIV-AFFECTED INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE (2010),
archived at http://perma.cc/RPH2-7QRL; see also Krisana M. Hodges, Trouble in Para-
dise: Barriers to Addressing Domestic Violence in Lesbian Relationships, 9 LAW & SEX-
UALITY 311, 311–13 (2000); Adele M. Morrison, Queering Domestic Violence to
“Straighten Out” Criminal Law: What Might Happen When Queer Theory and Practice
Meet Criminal Law’s Conventional Response to Domestic Violence, 13 S. CAL. REV. L. &
WOMEN’S STUD. 81, 82 (2003); Tara R. Pfeifer, Out of the Shadows: The Positive Impact
of Lawrence v. Texas on Victims of Same-Sex Domestic Violence, 109 PENN ST. L. REV.
1251, 1252–53, 1257–64 (2005); Giovanna Shay, [Including but Not Limited to] Violence
Against Women, 42 SW. L. REV. 801, 801–05 (2013).
18 See Bennett Capers, Real Rape Too, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1259, 1276 (2011).
19 See Todd Brower, Twelve Angry—and Sometimes Alienated—Men: The Exper-
iences and Treatment of Lesbians and Gay Men During Jury Service, 59 DRAKE L. REV.
669, 690, 699–700 (2011) [hereinafter Brower, Treatment of Lesbians and Gay Men in
Jury Service] (arguing that as acceptance of LGBT sexuality grows, LGBT persons in-
creasingly might seek access to courts “to resolve disputes and enforce rights” and that,
as these cases enter the courts, “[j]ury administrators, judges, and courts will increas-
ingly have to grapple with sexual minorities and the issues they raise”).
20 See generally Abbe Smith, The Complex Uses of Sexual Orientation in Criminal
Court, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 101, 103 (2002) (describing the various
tactical uses of sexual orientation in criminal litigation and positing that sympathy for
LGBT victims in high-profile cases like the Matthew Shepard case “does not necessarily
translate into any sort of sympathy or identification with the gay accused,” including
poor LGBT people of color accused of offenses like prostitution or solicitation).
21 Lynd, supra note 3, at 268–69. R
22 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013).
23 See Masuma Ahuja et al., The Changing Landscape on Same-Sex Marriage, WASH.
POST POLITICS (Feb. 27, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/
same-sex-marriage, archived at http://perma.cc/7MWQ-J959 (listing California, Con-
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Even some courts in solidly “red” states have ruled for marriage equality.24
More states have passed anti-discrimination provisions since 1998,25 and
public attitudes have made a profound shift on LGBT issues.26 These devel-
opments lessen the fear of discrimination, and it is likely that the mention of
same-sex relationships in voir dire will become increasingly normalized.27
However, in some jurisdictions and contexts, LGBT venirepersons still have
reason for concern.28 And in the vast majority of jurisdictions, there are no
necticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washing-
ton, and the District of Columbia); see also Illinois: Same-Sex Marriage is Legalized,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/21/us/illinois-same-sex-
marriage-is-legalized.html, archived at http://perma.cc/N4P9-KUV5; Erik Eckholm, Gay
Marriage Battle Nears End in Hawaii, the First Front Line, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/09/us/gay-marriage-battle-nears-end-in-hawaii-the-
first-front-line.html, archived at http://perma.cc/WE9K-KJP8; Jeremy W. Peters, Federal
Court Speaks, but Couples Still Face State Legal Patchwork, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/27/us/politics/federal-court-speaks-but-couples-still-
face-state-legal-patchwork.html, archived at http://perma.cc/V4B6-Z8ZM; Kate Zernike,
Same-Sex Marriages in New Jersey Can Begin, Court Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/19/nyregion/same-sex-marriages-in-new-jersey-can-
begin-court-rules.html, archived at http://perma.cc/8A8Q.
24 See, e.g., Bostic v. Rainey, No. 2:13cv395, 2014 WL 561978, at *23 (E.D. Va. Feb.
13, 2014) (invalidating Virginia’s ban on same-sex marriage on equal protection and due
process grounds); Bourke v. Beshear, No. 3:13-CV-750-H, 2014 WL 556729, at *8
(W.D. Ky. Feb. 12, 2014) (finding Kentucky’s failure to recognize same-sex marriages
violated equal protection); Kitchen v. Herbert, No. 2:13-cv-217, 2013 WL 6697874 (D.
Utah Dec. 10, 2013), stay granted pending appeal, 134 S. Ct. 893 (2014) (mem.); Bishop
v. United States ex rel. Holder, No. 04-CV-848-TCK-TLW, 2014 WL 116013, at *1
(N.D. Okla. Jan. 14, 2014); De Leon v. Perry, No. SA-13-CA-00982-OLG, 2014 WL
715741, at *27 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 2014); DeBoer v. Snyder, No. 12-CV-10285, 2014
WL 1100794, at *10, *17 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 21, 2014); Timothy Williams, New Virginia
Attorney General Drops Defense of Marriage Ban, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2014), http://
cached.newslookup.com/cached.php?ref_id=51&siteid=2041&id=4543553&t=
1390505451, archived at http://perma.cc/HJ39-TGHN.
25 See HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, STATEWIDE EMPLOYMENT LAWS AND POLICIES
(2014), archived at http://perma.cc/V2NF-275W.
26 See Adam Nagourney, Court Follows Nation’s Lead, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/27/us/politics/with-gay-marriage-a-tide-of-public-opin-
ion-that-swept-past-the-court.html, archived at http://perma.cc/LW7S-BEGZ (saying that
at the time of the Court’s historic decisions in Windsor and Hollingsworth “much of the
country had moved beyond the court”); see also Press Release, Williams Inst., Every
State Showing Gains in Public Support for Same-Sex Marriage (Apr. 5, 2013), archived
at http://perma.cc/RA5N-G23C.
27 Cf. Perkiss, supra note 16, at 813–15 (recognizing that a jury might include people R
with “competing moral views of homosexuality,” and that society has an “increasingly
positive view of homosexuality”; also arguing that, while views of homosexuality are not
uniformly positive, it is more likely today that gay jurors will be open about their sexual
orientation and that there will be more jurors who possess “sympathy for victims of
crimes motivated by homophobia”).
28 Cf. Tara Siegel Bernard, Fired for Being Gay? Protections Are Piecemeal, N.Y.
TIMES (May 31, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/01/your-money/protections-for-
gays-in-workplace-are-piecemeal.html?pagewanted=all, archived at http://perma.cc/
5DZG-8PN9 (describing uneven state-by-state anti-discrimination protections for LGBT
employees in the absence of a federal anti-discrimination statute).
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legal prohibitions against striking jurors based on sexual orientation.29 Since
LGBT identity is often not readily apparent, questions that focus on LGBT
issues might sometimes produce the unintended effect of “outing” some gay
and transgender jurors.30
This Article examines recent cases in which criminal justice actors have
confronted these complex issues. The paper is in three parts. Part I focuses
on voir dire questions regarding LGBT attitudes and same-sex sexuality, and
describes questions that attorneys have used in recent cases. Part II grapples
with the challenges of voir dire on such contested cultural terrain.31 Building
on the work of Cynthia Lee,32 I make suggestions for best practices in this
area based on social science research. While few jurors will broadcast racial
prejudice, prospective jurors express a variety of negative attitudes toward
same-sex sexuality,33 ranging from moral disapproval to outright animus.
Because potential jurors commonly state that their moral disapproval of
same-sex sexuality is based on religious beliefs, collisions between different
rights could arise during voir dire in this area. I argue that, while strikes
based on religious affiliation may be constitutionally suspect,34 courts should
excuse (and litigants may strike) jurors who express hostility to same-sex
sexuality, even if their views are ostensibly rooted in religious beliefs. Part
III addresses issues that can arise in voir dire for LGBT prospective jurors,
who could be “outed” as a result of voir dire on LGBT issues, as well as
29 Andy Birkey, Discrimination Against LGBT Jurors Remains Legal, HUFFINGTON
POST (May 1, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/01/lgbt-discrimination-ju-
rors_n_1466364.html, archived at http://perma.cc/X3MZ-HF39.
30 See Brower, Treatment of Lesbians and Gay Men in Jury Service, supra note 19, at R
680–88 (stating that LGBT jurors report sometimes feeling forced to “come out” in voir
dire).
31 See Cynthia Lee, The Gay Panic Defense, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 471, 566 (2008)
[hereinafter Lee, The Gay Panic Defense] (explaining that “[c]ontroversies over the
status of homosexuality are today the site of intense cultural dispute”) (quoting Robert
Post, Law and Cultural Conflict, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 485, 485–86 (2003)).
32 See generally id. at 471 (arguing that gay panic defense strategies are problematic
because “they reinforce and promote negative stereotypes about gay men as sexual devi-
ants and sexual predators” and they attempt to take advantage of existing unconscious
bias in favor of heterosexuality); Cynthia Lee, Masculinity on Trial: Gay Panic in the
Criminal Courtroom, 42 SW. L. REV. 817 (2013) [hereinafter Lee, Masculinity on Trial]
(discussing how gay and trans panic defense strategies are problematic because they at-
tempt to take advantage of conscious and unconscious bias against gay and trans individ-
uals and also reinforce negative stereotypes about those groups; suggesting ways to
defuse these tactics).
33 See Sean Overland, Strategies for Combating Anti-Gay Sentiment in the Court-
room, THE JURY EXPERT, March 2009, at 1, http://www.thejuryexpert.com/wp-content/
uploads/OverlandAntigaybiasTJEMarch09.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/QP8X-
SVMX (“[W]hile overt, anti-black sentiment has been largely relegated to the fringes of
American society, homophobic attitudes remain common and socially-acceptable in large
segments of the population.”).
34 Daniel M. Hinkle, Peremptory Challenges Based on Religious Affiliation: Are
They Constitutional?, 9 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 139, 141, 146 (2005) (arguing that the
“Constitution forbids the use of peremptory challenges based solely on . . . stereotypes
about religions but that a juror’s actual stated beliefs are a proper basis for exclusion even
if those beliefs are religiously inspired”).
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efforts to protect gay and transgender venirepersons from discrimination in
jury service.
I. TRENDS IN VOIR DIRE ABOUT LGBT ISSUES AND SEXUALITY
Voir dire on attitudes toward LGBT issues and sexuality could be ap-
propriate in a number of contexts.35 Depending on the circumstances, either
prosecutors or defense attorneys (or both) may seek to voir dire on these
issues.36 Prosecutors might ask such questions in cases that involve LGBT
victims, such as hate crimes or gay-bashings, fearing that homonegative ju-
rors may accept a “gay panic defense” or be loath to convict of crimes with
enhanced penalties.37 Defense attorneys may want to inquire into gay-nega-
tive attitudes in any criminal case in which a gay or transgender defendant’s
identity will become known to jurors.38 Research suggests that sexual assault
and intimate partner violence cases carry a particular risk that anti-gay bias
will play a role in the courtroom.39 In such cases, defense attorneys may be
35 See Smith, supra note 20, at 105–10 (discussing how issues of sexual orientation R
might surface in criminal prosecutions involving gay-bashing crimes, as well as in cases
in which LGBT people are charged with criminal offenses).
36 See Lynd, supra note 3, at 246–47, 249. Lynd focused on cases such as Dan R
White’s trial for the murder of Harvey Milk, in which defense counsel struck all jurors
who were perceived to be queer. However, Lynd also noted that, “Both sides could find
tactical benefit in knowing jurors’ sexual orientations . . . .” Id.; see also State v. Snipes,
No. COA10-442, 2011 WL 378798, at *2–4 (N.C. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2011). In Snipes, the
court rejected the defendant’s claim that, in a rape case, the prosecution opened the door
to cross-examination of the victim regarding her sexual orientation by asking a prospec-
tive juror who was a minister whether he preached against homosexuality, and by asking
other venirepersons voir dire questions including:
“Now in this case, you may hear evidence that one of the witnesses lives an
alternative lifestyle and that she may be a lesbian.”
“And again I will ask the three of you specifically, there may be some informa-
tion about a witness that lives an alternative lifestyle.”
“There are folks in our society that participate in alternative lifestyles.”
“And there has been some talk that there may be some folks who testify that
participate in an alternative lifestyle.”
“Any concerns about folks who may participate in alternative lifestyles?”
Id. at *2–6; see also State v. Aponte, 718 A.2d 36, 46–47 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998) (con-
cluding that there was no error in exploring attitudes toward defendant’s sexual orienta-
tion in voir dire when the victim in the child abuse case had referred to the defendant
using “the Spanish slang for lesbian”), rev’d in part on other grounds, 738 A.2d 117
(Conn. 1999).
37 See Smith, supra note 20, at 111–12 (describing the case of a lesbian couple at- R
tacked on the Appalachian trail, in which one woman was killed and the attacker at-
tempted to claim “homosexual panic”).
38 See Aaron M. Clemens, Executing Homosexuality: Removing Anti-Gay Bias from
Capital Trials, 6 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 71, 78, 82–83, 87–90 (2005) (describing the
potential for anti-gay bias in capital cases and in criminal trials more generally).
39 See Jennifer M. Hill, The Effects of Sexual Orientation in the Courtroom: A Double
Standard, 39 J. OF HOMOSEXUALITY 93, 102 (2000) (finding that gay men accused of
sexually assaulting straight men were more likely to be perceived as guilty by jurors than
straight men accused of assaulting women or gay men charged with raping other gay men
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concerned that homophobia could induce jurors to convict more readily or of
more serious offenses.40 Both prosecutors and defense attorneys may seek to
inquire into jurors’ attitudes in situations in which the alleged violence was
within the context of a same-sex relationship.41 Anti-LGBT bias may be a
concern when one of the people involved in the case is gay or transgender,
even when the subject matter of the case does not directly involve LGBT
issues.42
Jurors may be challenged for cause if they cannot be fair because of
their beliefs about LGBT sexuality.43 Courts have stated that disapproval of
same-sex sexuality alone may not merit a challenge for cause if the juror
states that she can nonetheless apply the law fairly.44 Advocates may also
and attributing this difference to homonegativity); Shane W. Kraus & Laurie L. Ragatz,
Gender, Jury Instructions, and Homophobia: What Influence Do These Factors have on
Legal Decision Making in a Homicide Case Where the Defendant Utilized the Homosex-
ual Panic Defense?, 47 CRIM. LAW. BULL. 237, 240 (2011)  (“Preliminary research dem-
onstrates that homosexual victims and defendants are frequently treated unjustly by the
courts, especially in sexual assault and domestic violence cases.” (footnote omitted));
Bradley H. White & Sharon E. Robinson Kurpius, Effects of Victim Sex and Sexual Ori-
entation on Perceptions of Rape, 46 SEX ROLES 191, 198 (2002) (finding that “negative
attitudes toward gay men and lesbians were positively related to traditional gender role
attitudes and to more blame assigned to a homosexual rape victim”).
40 See also Smith, supra note 20, at 103–06 (describing “routine disrespect” of poor R
gay and transgender people of color arrested for alleged sex work in local criminal courts
and discussing a trial lawyer’s concern that jurors might hold his client’s homosexuality
against her).
41 See id. at 104 (describing how a transgender woman abused by her boyfriend was
charged with assaulting him after police learned that she was transgender and became
hostile to her).
42 See id.
43 See, e.g., Multimedia WMAZ, Inc. v. Kubach, 443 S.E.2d 491, 493, 496 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1994) (finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excusing for cause
three potential jurors “who expressed bias against homosexuals” in a case in which the
plaintiff sued a TV station for damages for making his AIDS diagnoses public); State v.
Salmons, 509 S.E.2d 842, 862 (W. Va. 1998) (“The trial judge went to great lengths to
place on the record that the two jurors were not being struck because of their religion.
The jurors were struck because they admitted they held prejudices against homosexuals.
The trial court was not convinced by statements from both jurors that they would be able
to put aside their biases toward homosexuals.”); State v. Murray, 375 So. 2d 80, 83 (La.
1979) (concluding that the trial court was within its discretion to sustain the state’s chal-
lenge for cause of two jurors who stated that “under no circumstances would they believe
the testimony of a homosexual”); see also People v. Lee, Nos. 277551, 277552, 2008
WL 4276473, at *9–10 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 16, 2008) (in a case in which the appellate
opinion describes the defendant as having a “transgender appearance,” the trial court
“asked the prospective jurors if they ‘have any strong feelings about homosexuality that
would prevent [them] from fairly hearing this trial or affect [their] verdict.’ Each pro-
spective juror responded, no. The court also asked each potential juror if he or she could
be a fair and impartial juror in this case, to which each juror responded in the affirma-
tive.”). See generally Shauna C. Wagner, Annotation, Examination and Challenge of
State Case Jurors on Basis of Attitudes Toward Homosexuality, 80 A.L.R.5th 469 (2000)
(collecting cases that have discussed voir dire of jurors for prejudice against same-sex
sexuality and developed rules about juror questioning on this issue).
44 See People v. Simon, 100 P.3d 487, 493–95 (Colo. App. 2004) (acknowledging
that “this juror’s comments about homosexuality were troubling, especially given the
nature of the case,” but nonetheless concluding that the trial court’s acceptance of the
juror’s assurance that “she would base her decision on the evidence and the court’s in-
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seek to test jurors’ attitudes toward LGBT issues for the purpose of exercis-
ing peremptory challenges.45
Whether there is an inquiry into prejudice against gays—and the scope
of such an inquiry—rests within the discretion of the trial court.46 For this
reason, appeals courts historically have been loath to reverse trial courts that
have disallowed inquiry into jurors’ attitudes toward LGBT people.47 In
criminal cases in which the issues potentially turn on the subject of
prejudice, denying voir dire into possible biases may implicate constitutional
due process or Sixth Amendment rights.48 The fact that members of a minor-
structions on the law,” rather than her religious beliefs, “was not manifestly arbitrary,
unreasonable, or unfair”); State v. Miller, 476 S.E.2d 535, 552–53 (W. Va. 1996) (con-
cluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to strike jurors who
expressed homophobic attitudes for cause when jurors stated that they could be fair de-
spite disapproval of same-sex sexuality).
45 See State v. Dishon, 687 A.2d 1074, 1078, 1080–83 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1997) (concluding that the defendant should not have been excluded from in camera voir
dire regarding jurors’ attitudes toward same-sex sexuality and that individual voir dire on
these issues should not have continued after the defendant, who was accused of a gay-
bashing crime, had exhausted his peremptory challenges).
46 See Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 427 (1991) (“[O]ur own cases have
stressed the wide discretion granted to the trial court in conducting voir dire in . . . areas
of inquiry that might tend to show juror bias.”). See generally Wagner, supra note 43 R
(compiling appellate decisions applying the abuse of discretion standard to trial judges’
decisions about the scope of examination and challenge of prospective jurors on the basis
of their attitudes toward same-sex sexuality).
47 See, e.g., Gacy v. Welborn, 994 F.2d 305, 314 (7th Cir. 1993) (concluding that in
the capital trial of serial killer John Wayne Gacy, the trial court did not err in declining to
ask jurors “exactly what they thought about homosexuals,” when they were asked
“whether Gacy’s homosexuality . . . would affect their judgment.”); United States v.
Click, 807 F.2d 847, 848, 850 (9th Cir. 1987) (concluding that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in refusing to ask a proposed voir dire question “designed to explore
the jurors’ attitudes toward homosexuals” in a bank robbery case in which the defendant
was described as having “effeminate mannerisms”); State v. Lambert, 528 A.2d 890, 892
(Me. 1987) (finding that the trial court did not err in declining defendant’s request to voir
dire prospective jurors individually on their attitudes toward same-sex sexuality, when
the trial court asked jury venire as a group whether any prospective juror possessed be-
liefs regarding homosexuality that would cause that juror to be less than fair and impar-
tial); Toney v. Zarynoff’s, Inc., 775 N.E.2d 301, 307 (Mass. App. Ct. 2001)  (concluding
that it was not an abuse of discretion to decline to question prospective jurors about
possible anti-gay bias in a civil suit in which the plaintiff was gay, although the better
practice would have been to make the inquiry); Commonwealth v. McGregor, 655 N.E.2d
1278, 1278–79 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995)  (holding that it was not an abuse of discretion in a
same-sex rape case to deny a request for individual voir dire of jurors regarding attitudes
toward homosexuality); Commonwealth v. Proulx, 612 N.E.2d 1210, 1211–12  (Mass.
App. Ct. 1993) (same); Commonwealth v. Boyer, 507 N.E.2d 1024, 1025–27 (Mass.
1987) (same in case alleging common nightwalking). But see State v. Lovely, 451 A.2d
900, 901–02 (Me. 1982) (concluding that the trial court abused its discretion in summa-
rily refusing to ask jurors about anti-gay bias in a case in which the defendant was ac-
cused of setting fire to a gay bar that he may have frequented as a patron); State v. Van
Straten, 409 N.W.2d 448, 453 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987) (upholding the trial court’s lengthy
individual voir dire on prospective jurors’ attitudes toward AIDS and gay men as appro-
priate since the defendant was accused of spraying HIV-infected blood at his jailers).
48 See Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 525–27 (1973) (concluding that the trial
court’s refusal to question prospective jurors about possible racial prejudice violated due
process in a case in which an African American civil rights worker claimed that local law
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ity group are involved in a case does not by itself render voir dire for bias
constitutionally mandated,49 although it may be constitutionally required in
certain “special circumstances,”50 such as capital sentencing.51 Of course,
inquiry into possible bias may be prudent even if it is not constitutionally
required;52 the U.S. Supreme Court has exercised its supervisory power to
direct federal trial courts to conduct voir dire on racial bias if requested by
defendants in cases involving interracial violence.53 There is huge regional
diversity in the structure of voir dire, ranging from limited questioning con-
ducted by the court to inquiries by advocates of varying scope, which may
include questionnaires.54
Not too many years ago, voir dire about LGBT issues might have been
conducted in a fashion that only compounded stigmatization of LGBT peo-
ple, particularly if the individual at issue was the defendant in a serious
crime.55 Consider State v. Rulon,56 a 1997 Missouri homicide case in which
enforcement targeted him for marijuana charges); Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S.
308, 313 (1931) (in a case out of the District of Columbia courts, the Supreme Court
explained, “The right to examine jurors on the voir dire as to the existence of a disquali-
fying state of mind has been upheld with respect to other races than the black race, and in
relation to religious and other prejudices of a serious character.”); Ristaino v. Ross, 424
U.S. 589, 597 (1976) (explaining that, in Ham, voir dire on racial bias was constitution-
ally required because “[r]acial issues were inextricably bound up with the conduct of the
trial” (discussing Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 525–27 (1973))). But see Kemp
v. Ryan, 638 F.3d 1245, 1261–63 (9th Cir. 2011) (rejecting Arizona prisoner’s claim for
federal habeas relief based on the alleged failure of the trial court to permit voir dire on
issue of anti-gay bias, explaining, inter alia, that the defendant “has not offered any case
law holding that homophobia should be elevated to the same level as racial prejudice”).
49 Ristaino, 424 U.S. at 597–98 (concluding that voir dire regarding racial prejudice
was not mandated by the federal Constitution in every interracial crime). See generally
Cynthia Lee, Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martin and Implicit Bias in a Not Yet Post-
Racial Society, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1555, 1590–93 (2013) [hereinafter Lee, Making Race
Salient] (discussing Supreme Court doctrine on voir dire regarding racial bias).
50 Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36–37 (1986) (describing Ham’s “special circum-
stances” rule (citing Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 527 (1973))).
51 Id. at 36–37 (“[A] capital defendant accused of an interracial crime is entitled to
have prospective jurors informed of the race of the victim and questioned on the issue of
racial bias.” (footnote omitted)).
52 See Ristaino, 424 U.S. at 597 n.9 (recognizing that, although voir dire on racial
prejudice might not be constitutionally required in every interracial crime, the “wiser
course” was to voir dire on the subject of racial prejudice, and that, if the case arose out
of a federal trial court, the Supreme Court would have exercised its supervisory powers to
direct trial judges to voir dire on the issue).
53 Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 192 (1981) (“[F]ederal trial courts
must make [an inquiry into racial prejudice] when requested by a defendant accused of a
violent crime and where the defendant and the victim are members of different racial or
ethnic groups.”).
54 Marie Comiskey, Does Voir Dire Serve As a Powerful Disinfectant or Pollutant? A
Look at the Disparate Approaches to Jury Selection in the United States and Canada, 59
DRAKE L. REV. 733, 742 (2011) (discussing a first-of-its-kind, state-by-state study of jury
voir dire practices conducted by the National Center for State Courts in 2007, and stating
that the “authors reported tremendous variation in jury selection procedures from state to
state, including a traditional, limited voir dire with no questionnaire, general or case-
specific questionnaires, individual questioning in the jury box, and group questioning”).
55 See Joan W. Howarth, The Geronimo Bank Murders: A Gay Tragedy, in 2 SEXUAL-
ITY AND LAW: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 389, 399–406 (Ruthann Robson ed., 2011)
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the defendant was accused of killing his same-sex partner.57 He claimed self-
defense, alleging that the partner had been abusive.58 The defendant’s own
attorney conducted voir dire in a manner that invited conformity with
strongly anti-LGBT social views. Defense counsel said to the jury panel
(asking for a show of hands in front of the other venirepersons): “Many
people believe that homosexuality is against God’s law. I want to know how
many people share that view?”59 After more than half the venirepersons
raised their hands, the defense attorney asked a follow-up question: “Any of
you who—are there any of you who believe that homosexuality is against
God’s law who would be able to follow man’s law instead, in this courtroom,
and leave God’s will up to God?”60 The defendant was convicted of second-
degree murder; his claim on appeal was that voir dire into jurors’ attitudes
toward homosexuality had been unduly restricted.61 The Missouri Court of
Appeals rejected this claim, stating that, “The court was quite generous in
excusing for cause any venireperson that indicated an inability to be fair
because of defendant’s sexual preference.”62
Recent cases demonstrate more adept attempts to gauge jurors’ views.
These more recent voir dire inquiries do not assume a broad anti-LGBT con-
sensus, and accord prospective jurors more privacy in which to express their
views. However, voir dire in similar cases might be strengthened yet further
if advocates make more use of social science to gauge homonegative atti-
tudes in potential jurors.
For example, the jury questionnaire from the Ravi case included four
questions about LGBT issues and sexuality:
Do you have any particular views on lesbian, gay, homosex-
ual, and/or bisexual issues (e.g. Don’t Ask Don’t Tell, gay mar-
riage, etc.)? If yes, please explain.
Do you have any religious beliefs or other strong personal
convictions which would make it uncomfortable or impossible for
you to fairly and impartially consider a case involving homosexu-
(describing homophobic descriptions of gay defendants in jury selection in Geronimo,
Oklahoma). See generally Developments in the Law—Sexual Orientation and the Law,
102 HARV. L. REV. 1508, 1541–55 (1989) (discussing gay men and lesbians as victims
and defendants in the criminal justice system in the 1980s, and touching on issues relat-
ing to voir dire for anti-gay bias, arguing that “defense attorneys who anticipate refer-
ences to a defendant’s homosexuality or the presence of gay-related issues at trial should
be entitled to conduct voir dire to discover anti-gay biases”); Sheila A. Skojec, Annota-
tion, Examination and Challenge of Federal Case Jurors on Basis of Attitudes Toward
Homosexuality, 85 A.L.R. FED. 864 (1987) (describing older cases in which dated atti-
tudes limited voir dire on anti-gay bias).
56 935 S.W.2d 723 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
57 Id. at 724.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 725.
61 Id. at 724.
62 Id. at 726.
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ality as a sexual orientation or lifestyle and involving testimony
concerning homosexual activity? If yes, please explain.
Have you heard any stereotypes about homosexual individu-
als? If yes, explain.
Have you ever used the internet to conduct research about
someone who is homosexual? If yes, what website(s) did you use?
What were the circumstances?63
The prosecutor also attempted to ask probing questions about the jurors’
attitudes toward LGBT issues and sexuality in a 2011 case in Ventura
County, California. In that case, teen Brendan McInerney was tried for the
shooting of his junior high classmate Lawrence King, who identified as gay
and was described by observers as gender nonconforming.64 In this high-
profile case, McInerney, who was fourteen years old at the time of the kill-
ing, was charged as an adult with premeditated murder and hate crimes.65
Observers describe the defense as a claim of “gay panic,” painting fifteen-
year-old King as “flirtatio[us]” and “sexually aggressive.”66 In jury selec-
tion, prospective jurors were asked about their attitudes toward LGBT sexu-
ality first in the juror questionnaire, and again in voir dire, which was
conducted in groups of twelve in the jury box.67 In the questionnaire,
venirepersons were asked, “Do you have strong feelings or opinions about
homosexuality or gender identity issues that would impact your ability to be
a fair and impartial juror in a case involving these issues?”68 In voir dire,
prosecutor Maeve Fox asked questions along the following lines (not
verbatim):
What are your feelings about Gay Marriage?
What are your feelings about Prop 8?
Do you believe that the hate crimes law should apply to is-
sues regarding sexuality and gender identity?
If I held up a picture of two men kissing, would it make you
uncomfortable? If so, can you gauge your level of discomfort for
me?69
The proceedings ended in a hung jury, and McInerney ultimately pled
guilty to second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter.70
63 Email from Christopher Schellhorn to author, supra note 9. R
64 See Perkiss, supra note 16, at 785, 788–89. R
65 Id. at 788–89.
66 Id. at 782–83, 790–93.
67 Telephone Interview with Maeve Fox, Senior Deputy District Attorney, Ventura
County District Attorney’s Office (June 11, 2013).
68 Juror Questionnaire at 10, People v. McInerney, No. 2008005782 (Ventura Cnty.
Super. Ct. 2009) (on file with author).
69 Email from Maeve Fox, Senior Deputy District Attorney, Ventura County District
Attorney’s Office, to author (June 11, 2013, 4:54 PM EST) (attachment) (on file with
author).
70 Perkiss, supra note 16, at 793–94. R
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While voir dire in the Ravi and King cases did attempt to gauge jurors’
unstated or unconscious feelings about homosexuality, such inquiries might
also benefit from using social science to assess prospective jurors’ possible
homonegative attitudes. In some hate crimes prosecutions, attorneys and
judges simply ask venirepersons if they can be fair. As discussed further in
Part II.A.,71 “fairness” questions may be problematic because some
venirepersons are understandably loath to admit—or are even unaware—that
they cannot be fair.72
An example of a case in which fairness questions figured prominently
was the David Jason Jenkins prosecution, an October 2012 federal prosecu-
tion in Kentucky for an alleged anti-gay hate crime.73 The Jenkins case was
the first prosecution under the Matthew Shepard-James Byrd Jr. Hate Crimes
Prevention Act,74 which was expanded in 2009 to cover crimes against gay
and transgender victims.75 Four defendants were prosecuted—Anthony Ray
Jenkins, David Jason Jenkins, Mable Ashley Jenkins, and Alexis Leeann Jen-
kins.76 Ashley and Alexis pled guilty to aiding and abetting a hate crime.77
Anthony and Jason went to trial and were acquitted of the federal hate
crimes charges, although the jury convicted them of kidnapping offenses.78
The district court in the Jenkins case inquired whether jurors held any beliefs
about gays that would prevent them from judging the facts fairly.79  Noting
that “[i]t’s a little bit of an uncharted area,” the inquiry was conducted at
71 See infra Part II.A.
72 See Caroline B. Crocker & Margaret Bull Kovera, The Effects of Rehabilitative
Voir Dire on Juror Bias and Decision Making, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 212, 212–13
(2010).
73 2 Kentucky Men Acquitted of Hate Crimes in 1st Prosecution Under U.S. Law
Expanded to Protect Gays, FOX NEWS (Oct. 25, 2012) [hereinafter 2 Kentucky Men],
http://www.foxnews.com/us/2012/10/25/2-ky-men-acquitted-hate-crimes-in-1st-prosecu-
tion-under-us-law-expanded-to, archived at http://perma.cc/8AAU-E6V7.
74 Id.
75 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(2) (2012) (providing federal criminal penalties for violent acts
motivated by “actual or perceived religion, national origin, gender, sexual orientation,
gender identity, or disability of any person”); see Matthew Shepard & James Byrd, Jr.,
Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/
crm/matthewshepard.php (last visited Feb. 3, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/F3LZ-
J5MR; see also Kami Chavis Simmons, Subverting Symbolism: The Matthew Shepard
and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act and Cooperative Federalism, 49 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1863, 1865–66 (2012).
76 United States v. Jenkins, Nos. 12-13-GFVT, 12-14-GFVT, 12-15-GFVT, 2013 WL
3158210, at *1 (E.D. Ky. June 20, 2013).
77  Id. at *2 (describing the history of the case in a sentencing memorandum).
78 Id.
79  E.g., Transcript of Record at 141–42, 144–45, United States v. Jenkins, Nos. 12-
13-GFVT, 12-14-GFVT, 12-15GFVT (E.D. Ky. June 20, 2013) [hereinafter Jenkins Tran-
script of Record]. The defendant David Jason Jenkins’s proposed voir dire asked not only
about “prejudice towards or against homosexuals,” but also, inter alia, “whether or not
any of the potential veneer [sic] men have homosexual relations, friends or relation-
ships.” [Defendant’s] Statement of the Case, Proposed Jury Instructions, Proposed Voir
Dire, at 2, United States v. David Jason Jenkins, No. 6:12-CR-00015-GFVT-1 (E.D. Ky.
Oct. 2, 2012). However, it does not appear from the voir dire transcript that the court
asked this question. Jenkins Transcript of Record, supra.
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the bench in individual voir dire.80 The judge asked whether jurors had any
personal feelings “either positive or negative” that “would cause you to
judge someone who is gay or bisexual differently than someone else” or
“that would make it difficult for you to be fair and impartial to both sides.”81
The court also told jurors that “this is a case that involves a law that the
Congress of the United States has enacted that makes it a crime in certain
circumstances to physically assault someone because of their sexual orienta-
tion,” and asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the law.82
Voir dire on attitudes toward same-sex relationships also appears in
cases in which the defendant—or both the defendant and the victim—are
lesbians or gay men. Massachusetts courts have recognized since the mid-
1990s that voir dire to identify possible anti-LGBT bias may be appropriate
in cases involving gay victims.83 One highly publicized case in Massachu-
setts in 2013 was the trial of Cara Rintala, who was accused of the homicide
of her wife, Annamarie Rintala.84 The case is believed to be the first alleged
domestic violence homicide in Massachusetts involving a legally married
lesbian couple.85 The Rintala case produced a mistrial in March 2013,86 lead-
ing to a retrial in January 2014 that also ended in a mistrial.87 Voir dire in the
2013 trial included questioning along the following lines, conducted by the
court at side bar during individual voir dire:88
80 Jenkins Transcript of Record, supra note 79, at 215 (The court explained: “I did R
make the decision to ask these questions at the bench. It’s a little bit of an uncharted area
in terms of how people respond and make sure we get honest responses, and it takes an
extra amount of time, but feel like it’s been important in this particular case”).
81 Id. at 139–40.
82 See, e.g., id. at 162.
83 In 1996, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court concluded that trial judges
may—but are not required to—conduct individual voir dire of jurors in cases in which a
victim is gay or bisexual. Commonwealth v. Plunkett, 664 N.E.2d 833, 838 & n.3 (Mass.
1996) (approving “general questions of the type the judge put to the venire collectively”
as “sufficient in seeking to identify bias.” The questions in Plunkett were: “[I]s there
anything about [the fact that the victim was gay or bisexual] which would interfere with
anyone’s ability to be fair and impartial?” and “is there anything about that circumstance
that would bias or prejudice anyone either the prosecution or the defense?” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
84 The Republican Newsroom, Hung Jury Results in Mistrial in Cara Rintala Murder
Trial, MASS LIVE (Mar. 13, 2013), http://www.masslive.com/news/index.ssf/2013/03/
hung_jury_in_cara_rintala_murd.html, archived at http://perma.cc/PP8A-BBVA.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 The Republican Newsroom, Cara Rintala Retrial Ends in Hung Jury; Judge De-
clares Mistrial, MASS LIVE (Feb. 4, 2014), http://www.masslive.com/news/index.ssf/
2014/02/cara_rintala_retrial_verdict.html, archived at http://perma.cc/QF9S-HLDV.
88 Defendant’s Proposed Voir Dire Questions, Commonwealth v. Rintala, No.
HSCR2011-128 (Hampshire Super. Ct. Feb. 5, 2013) [hereinafter Rintala Defendant’s
Proposed Voir Dire Questions]. The State’s proposed voir dire was similar:
1. Same-Sex Marriage: You will hear evidence that the defendant and the dece-
dent were a same-sex married couple. Is there anything about that fact that might
in any way prevent you from being a fair and impartial juror in this case? 2.
Same-Sex Adoptive Parents: You will hear evidence that at the time of this inci-
dent, the defendant and the decedent were same-sex adoptive parents to a two-
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5. The victim in this case is Annamarie Rintala and the defen-
dant is Cara Rintala. Annamarie and Cara are lesbians who
were legally married at the time of Annamarie’s death. They
had adopted a child and were raising her together at the time
of Annamarie’s death.
a. Is there anything about these facts that would cause you to be
anything less than completely fair and impartial in judging this
case?
b. Are you troubled at all by the fact that the victim and the
defendant were partners in a gay marriage? Do you think that
this would affect you in any way in deliberating on this case?
c. Are you troubled at all by the fact that this lesbian couple had
adopted a child and were raising her together? Do you think
that this fact would affect you in any way in deliberating on
this case?89
A similar inquiry was posed in another relatively recent Massachusetts
case, Commonwealth v. Almonte.90 Almonte was convicted of murder for the
stabbing death of a man with whom he had a sexual relationship.91 During
voir dire, the court addressed each prospective juror as follows:
There may be evidence in this case that the alleged victim engaged
in a sexual relationship with the defendant as well as other men. Is
there anything about either the defendant or the alleged victim’s
sexual orientation that would interfere with your ability to be fair
and impartial?92
A Connecticut appellate court began to define the outer limits of voir
dire on LGBT issues in 2009, concluding that some questions exceeded per-
missible attempts to gauge possible juror bias and instead were attempts to
test a defense theory on the jury pool.93 In that case, an Amtrak police officer
was accused of the sexual assault of a university student to whom he offered
year-old girl. Is there anything about that fact that might in any way prevent you
from being a fair and impartial juror in this case?
Commonwealth’s Proposed Jury Venire Voir Dire Questions, Commonwealth v. Rintala,
No. HSCR2011-128 (Hampshire Super. Ct. Feb. 5, 2013).
89 Rintala Defendant’s Proposed Voir Dire Questions, supra note 88. Media reports of R
the 2014 retrial suggest voir dire questioning was similar, with the judge asking questions
described as: “[D]oes the fact that Rintala and the victim were lesbians and married to
each other bother prospective jurors enough to impair their ability to be objective and
fair?” Jack Flynn, Cara Rintala Retrial: Live Coverage of Day 1 of Jury Selection, MASS
LIVE (Jan. 7, 2014), http://www.masslive.com/news/index.ssf/2014/01/cara_rintala_re-
trial_live_cove.html, archived at http://perma.cc/EJ5X-YR3C.
90 988 N.E.2d 415 (Mass. 2013).
91 Id. at 417–18.
92 Telephone Interview with Kenneth E. Steinfield, Assistant District Attorney (May
22, 2013).
93 State v. Thornton, 963 A.2d 1099, 1106–07 (Conn. App. 2009).
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a ride home from the train station.94 He was convicted of lesser-included
offenses, second-degree unlawful restraint and fourth-degree sexual as-
sault.95 The defendant was married at the time of the incident.96 Connecticut
law provides a right to individual voir dire of prospective jurors in criminal
cases, thus providing a relatively liberal opportunity to probe jurors’ atti-
tudes.97 During the voir dire, the following colloquy ensued:
[Defense Counsel]: This case is a male—an accusation of a male
on male sexual assault. Is there anything about that type of accusa-
tion that would—you would feel uncomfortable sitting as a ju-
ror—
[J]:98 No . . . .
[Defense Counsel]: And do you know anything about or have you
heard anything about male on male sexual assault cases or
incidents?
[J]: No.
* * *
[Defense Counsel]:  Next question is that do you have any male
friends or family, male family members who you know to be gay?
[J]:  Yes.
[Defense Counsel]: And have you ever discussed issues of vio-
lence committed against gay men with them?
[J]: No.
[Defense Counsel]: And you know the terms ‘in the closet’ or ‘out
of the closet’?
[J]: Yeah.
[Defense Counsel]: In the closet meaning people who may be gay
but aren’t publicly, to the world, letting anyone know.
[J]: Right.99
At this point, defense counsel began asking questions about the pro-
spective jurors’ personal experiences with closeted gay male friends or fam-
ily, drawing an objection from the prosecutor.
[Defense Counsel]: Do you know anyone who you think might or
might not be sort of gay but not publicly out there?
[J]: Yes.
94 Id. at 1102–03.
95 Id. at 1103.
96 Id. at 1105. Presumably, the defendant was married to a woman at the time of the
2005 incident, because same-sex marriage was not recognized in Connecticut until 2008.
See Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 412 (Conn. 2008).
97 Thornton, 963 A.2d at 1106 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 54-82f, 54-82g (2013)).
98 “[J]” refers to the fifth prospective juror. Id. at 1104.
99 Id. (brackets in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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[Defense Counsel]: And kind of what kind of—what makes you
think that they might be?
[The Prosecutor]: Well, at this point, I think I’m going to object to
that question, if Your Honor, please. I think that’s going far field
[sic], and I object to it.100
The court asked the prosecutor why he was objecting at that time to this
line of questioning, since the same questions had been asked before without
objection.101 The prosecutor responded that he had been waiting to object to
queries “about males with regard to coming out of the closet, whether they
are gay or not.”102 He also stated that defense counsel should articulate a
reason why these questions related to the case.103
Noting that his client was a married man with a child, defense counsel
responded that he needed to know jurors’ attitudes toward men who are
struggling with their sexuality.104 Counsel stated that he felt he had to gauge
how prospective jurors would react to the defendant.105 He said:
I’ve never defended a same sex case; I’ve defended and prosecuted
a number of male-female cases. . . . That issue was not an issue in
those kinds of cases. I wouldn’t have to go there in those kinds of
cases. In this case . . . I do have to voir dire on it because . . . these
people . . . are going to be thinking about those facts about the
complaining witness, and they’re going to . . . be thinking about it
about my client. And so I do think I . . . have to go there to a
certain degree. . . . I’m very uncomfortable doing it, but I think in
this case it’s very, very important.106
The trial court sustained the prosecutor’s objection to this line of ques-
tioning.107 It explained that, “the sexual orientation of either the defendant or
the [victim] is not relevant to the jury’s consideration here.”108 The court
said, “[t]his is an accusation of fact,” and that the “root motivation” was
not relevant.109 It ruled that it would allow some questioning along defense
counsel’s lines if “the whole question of someone’s struggling with their
sexuality was . . . explicitly in the case.”110 Nonetheless, it concluded that
Connecticut law did not permit attorneys to “test out” jurors’ “reaction . . .
to the facts” in voir dire.111
100 Id. (brackets in original) (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
101 Id.
102 Id. at 1104–05 (internal quotation marks omitted).
103 Id. at 1105.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 1105 n.11 (internal quotation marks omitted).
107 Id. at 1105.
108 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
109 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
110 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
111 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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When the fifth prospective juror returned to the stand, defense counsel
stated, “I take it that there is nothing about a same sex sexual assault, that
allegation alone, that would make you uncomfortable about sitting and hear-
ing the facts and the evidence and being fair to both sides.”112 After agreeing
with that statement, the venire member was seated as a member of the
jury.113 For the remainder of the voir dire, attorneys for both sides continued
to ask prospective jurors if they or anyone they knew had been the victim of
or accused of a sexual assault, and whether there was anything that would
prohibit them from being fair in a same-sex sexual assault case.114 The court
excused for cause those jurors who responded “yes” to either of those
questions.115
Following his conviction for lesser-included offenses, the defendant ap-
pealed the trial court’s resolution of this voir dire issue.116 The Appellate
Court of Connecticut affirmed the trial court’s ruling,117 reasoning that, al-
though a criminal defendant has the right to challenge jurors who “are una-
ble to set aside preconceived notions,” a defendant cannot win on appeal
simply by “asserting that a prohibited line of questioning would have ex-
posed potential bias.”118 It reasoned that attempts to question prospective
jurors regarding “assumptions or hypotheses concerning the evidence which
may be offered at the trial . . . should be discouraged.”119 The court ex-
plained that such questions were often an attempt to test a defense theory,
“to implant in [the juror’s] mind a prejudice or prejudgment on [certain]
issues.”120 The appellate court noted that defense counsel was permitted to
ask “questions regarding attitudes toward homosexuality in general,” and
that “[i]n a case concerning a male on male, or female on female, sexual
assault, relevant questions that delve into prejudices, beliefs and attitudes
toward homosexuality should be permitted.”121 Ultimately, it affirmed the
defendant’s conviction.122 The Supreme Court of Connecticut denied
certification.123
On a doctrinal level, this case grapples with the outer limits of question-
ing that a defendant can demand when delving into prospective jurors’ ex-
periences with LGBT issues.124 Its appearance in the criminal justice system
112 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
113 Id.
114 Id. at 1105.
115 Id. at 1105–06.
116 Id. at 1101–03.
117 Id. at 1108–09.
118 Id. at 1106 (internal quotation marks omitted).
119 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
120 Id. at 1107 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
121 Id. at 1107–08.
122 Id. at 1108–09.
123 State v. Thornton, 970 A.2d 727, 727 (Conn. 2009).
124 See also Shaw v. Hedgpeth, No. C 10-5800 LHK (PR), 2012 WL 2906243, at *1,
*3, *5–6  (N.D. Cal. July 16, 2012) (rejecting a California prisoner’s claim for federal
habeas relief; the prisoner had asserted that the state trial court had unduly restricted voir
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also illustrates how issues of actual or perceived sexual orientation may pre-
sent themselves as more cases involving male sexual victimization make
their way into the legal system. As the defense attorney’s comments under-
line, Thornton also demonstrates some criminal justice actors’ lack of experi-
ence in dealing with same-sex allegations, as well as potential concerns
about identifying anti-LGBT sentiment in the jury pool.
II. VOIR DIRE ON CONTESTED TERRAIN: TOWARD BEST PRACTICES
Scholars working on issues of racial bias in the courts focus increas-
ingly on issues of implicit bias.125 Important scholarship in this area is
grounded in social science research on cognition.126 That research demon-
strates that, in psychological testing, the vast majority of white Americans
demonstrate implicit bias against African Americans, and a similar majority
of straights manifest bias against gays, regardless of whether they report
conscious feelings of prejudice.127 At this time of rapidly changing and di-
vided attitudes toward same-sex sexuality,128 we are not yet at a point where
we can concentrate entirely on eradicating this implicit bias. While prospec-
tive jurors in the United States in the twenty-first century are unlikely to
voice express racial bias in voir dire, some jurors continue to express disap-
proval of same-sex sexuality, sometimes rooted in religious belief. In the
social science literature, such beliefs are described as “old-fashioned
dire on his anticipated defense of “homosexual panic,” but the federal court denied relief,
concluding that there was no right to voir dire the jurors specifically on their attitudes
toward that issue).
125 See Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias and
the Law, 58 UCLA L. Rev. 465, 465 (2010) (explaining that while “central civil rights
questions” were once “indisputably normative,” they now focus on “the underlying em-
pirics,” including questions like whether we in fact live in a “colorblind society”).
126 See, e.g., Lee, Making Race Salient, supra note 49, at 1592–93 (arguing that attor- R
neys should not ask prospective jurors in voir dire if they hold racial biases, but rather
should educate venirepersons about implicit bias and about the role of race in the case).
See generally Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124
(2012) [hereinafter Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom] (suggesting strategies to
counter implicit bias in the courtroom); Anna Roberts, (Re)Forming the Jury: Detection
and Disinfection of Implicit Juror Bias, 44 CONN. L. REV. 827 (2012) (discussing how
the Implicit Association Test could be used).
127 See Lee, The Gay Panic Defense, supra note 31, at 539–40 (“Eighty-eight percent R
of Whites who have taken the [Implicit Association Test] have manifested implicit bias
in favor of Whites and against Blacks. Nearly 83% of heterosexuals have manifested
implicit bias in favor of straight people over gays and lesbians.”); see also Perkiss, supra
note 16, at 806–16 (describing Lee’s proposals, based on social science research on im- R
plicit bias, for addressing implicit anti-gay and anti-trans bias).
128 See John Harwood, A Sea Change in Less Than 50 Years as Gay Rights Gained
Momentum, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/26/us/in-less-
than-50-years-a-sea-change-on-gay-rights.html, archived at http://perma.cc/N5XL-J5KM
(reporting that 53% of survey respondents favored legal recognition of same-sex
marriages).
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homonegativity.”129 The reality of “competing moral views of homosexual-
ity”130 is the first LGBT-related issue that judges and lawyers are likely to
confront in voir dire. For this reason—as well as the fact that LGBT identity
is often not manifest—voir dire to identify anti-gay bias differs in significant
ways from questioning to uncover racial bias.
In an important 2008 article, The Gay Panic Defense, Professor Cynthia
Lee drew on social science research to suggest means for uncovering anti-
gay bias in voir dire and reducing its influence in jury deliberations.131 In this
Part, I expand on and critique the strategies outlined in Lee’s article. My
major departure from Lee’s work on implicit bias is that, as I demonstrate
with transcript excerpts, many jurors do in fact express homonegative be-
liefs, and those jurors often are not removed for cause. Lee writes that, “Just
as few individuals are likely to answer affirmatively if asked, ‘Are you
prejudiced against Blacks?’ few individuals are likely to admit that they are
prejudiced against gays and lesbians.”132 She goes on to identify three possi-
ble categories of jurors: “explicit homophobes” who will voice their bias,
“closet homophobes” who are biased against LGBT persons but will not say
so publicly, and “implicit homophobes” who believe that they are egalita-
rian but have unconscious biases.133 Lee writes that the “explicit
homophobes” would “likely be subject to a challenge for cause.”134 Lee then
focuses on voir dire questions to identify the “closet homophobes.”135 If
“explicit homophobes” and most “closet homophobes” are removed from
the jury, Lee reasons, attorneys can focus on techniques to “make[ ] sexual
orientation salient” that will help guard against the influence of implicit anti-
gay bias in deliberations.136
This Part takes Lee’s article as a starting point, both building on and
taking issue with some of her work’s assumptions, specifically the premise
that jurors who express anti-LGBT bias necessarily will be removed for
cause. The Part is in four subparts. As I demonstrate in Part II.A, many
jurors who express moral disapproval of homosexuality or who are affiliated
with religions that condemn LGBT sexuality likely will not be removed for
129 Melanie A. Morrison & Todd G. Morrison, Development and Validation of a Scale
Measuring Modern Prejudice Toward Gay Men and Lesbian Women, 43 J. HOMOSEXUAL-
ITY 15, 17–18 (2002) (describing “old-fashioned” anti-gay prejudice as “prejudice rooted
in traditional religious and moral beliefs and misconceptions about homosexuality,” and
contrasting it with “modern” homonegativity, which is characterized by beliefs including
the notion that gay men and lesbians are making illegitimate demands for change because
anti-LGBT discrimination has been eradicated).
130 Perkiss, supra note 16, at 813–14 (advocating express discussion of homophobia R
in cases involving gay and trans panic defenses because “[v]oicing competing moral
views of homosexuality is more likely in groups” and can help to defeat bias).
131 Lee, The Gay Panic Defense, supra note 31, at 476–77. R
132 Id. at 561.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 562.
135 Id. at 562–63.
136 Id. at 563–64.
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cause.137 I argue that jurors who express hostility toward LGBT sexuality
should be removed for cause in cases involving LGBT issues, even if jurors’
anti-gay beliefs are rooted in religious teachings. In Part II.B, I expand on
Lee’s work on voir dire questions to uncover unspoken or implicit bias. In
Part II.C, I point out a potential collision course in gauging homophobia by
inquiring about jurors’ religious affiliations: strikes based on religious identi-
fication alone may be impermissible. Part II.D concludes by emphasizing
that the cognitive science research discussed in work by Lee and others sug-
gests both useful voir dire questions to identify anti-gay sentiment and tools
for reducing its influence in jury deliberations.
A. “Explicit138-But-Fair” Homonegativity: Challenges for Cause
Reported decisions and voir dire transcripts reveal that some jurors,
even in relatively liberal jurisdictions, continue to express disapproval of
homosexuality, sometimes citing religious beliefs.139 These statements range
from assertions of moral or religious beliefs that homosexuality is wrong (“I
think that they are morally wrong;”140 “[M]y religious convictions tell me
that homosexuality is a sin;”141 “I’m a Catholic, my religion”142) to outright
137 Cf. id. at 561 (describing “closet homophobes” as “individuals who will not say
publicly that they think gays are immoral and deviant, but actually believe that gays are
immoral and deviant”).
138 Id. (discussing the term “explicit homophobe”); Kang, et al., Implicit Bias in the
Courtroom, supra note 126, at 1132 (“[E]xplicit biases are attitudes and stereotypes that R
are consciously accessible through introspection and endorsed as appropriate.” (emphasis
omitted)).
139 See People v. Simon, 100 P.3d 487, 494–95 (Colo. App. 2004) (concluding that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s challenge for cause as to
a particular juror even though the juror who, when she learned the case “involved allega-
tions of a homosexual relationship . . . said it made her feel ‘sick’” and “explained that
her belief system ‘says homosexuality is wrong,’” because she said “she would base her
decision on the evidence and the court’s instructions on the law”); State v. Miller, 476
S.E.2d 535, 552–53 (W. Va. 1996) (concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion in declining to strike jurors who expressed homophobic attitudes for cause, when
jurors stated that they could be fair despite disapproval of same-sex sexuality).
140 Transcript of Record at 32–33, Commonwealth v. Miller, No. ESCR-01-1169 (Es-
sex Super. Ct. May 10, 2004) [hereinafter Miller Transcript of Record] (“I do not believe
that people are born homosexuals. I believe that they are, through some kind of circum-
stance, they develop that inclination. . . . I think that they are morally wrong.”).
141 Transcript of Record at II-33, Commonwealth v. Miller, No. ESCR-01-1169 (Es-
sex Super. Ct. May 11, 2004) (“[M]y religious convictions tell me that homosexuality is
a sin, as far as that goes.”).
142 Transcript of Record at 133, Commonwealth v. Almonte, 988 N.E.2d 415 (Mass.
2013) (No. SJC-11027) [hereinafter Almonte Transcript of Record] (excusing a juror for
cause after stating that the evidence in the case would involve same-sex sexuality; the
court asked whether “that would interfere with your ability to decide what the facts are
from the evidence and follow my instructions of law?” and the juror responded, “I’m a
Catholic, my religion,” and agreed that would affect how she decided the facts).
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animus (“I just don’t like queers”143); to ambivalent feelings (“I hope I
would be able to see past that, but I can’t guarantee you that, no”144).
Courts have concluded that these jurors can be challenged for cause if
they cannot be impartial due to their beliefs about homosexuality.145 How-
ever, some courts have said that jurors need not be removed for cause based
on a religious belief that homosexuality is wrong, provided that the trial
judge is convinced by the jurors’ assurances that they can put aside their
religious beliefs and evaluate the facts of the case fairly.146 This can some-
143 Miller Transcript of Record, supra note 140, at 189.  The juror was excused for R
cause after the court asked, “Do you think there is anything about [evidence of same-sex
relationships] that you think would get in the way of your ability to be a fair and impar-
tial juror?” and the juror responded, “No, I don’t think so. I just don’t like queers.” Id.
144 Almonte Transcript of Record, supra note 142, at 112–13 (excusing the juror after R
he was asked whether the sexual orientation of the defendant or victim would cause him
to be less than fair and impartial, and he responded, “I would hope that I could be partial
[sic], but I honestly don’t know if I could be impartial”).
145 This determination is committed to the trial courts’ discretion. See Skilling v.
United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2918 (2010) (explaining that “estimation of a juror’s
impartiality” is entrusted to the trial court’s discretion because the trial court can assess
“the prospective juror’s inflection, sincerity, demeanor, candor, body language, and ap-
prehension of duty”); see also State v. Salmons, 509 S.E.2d 842, 862 (W. Va. 1998)
(“The trial judge went to great lengths to place on the record that the two jurors were not
being struck because of their religion. The jurors were struck because they admitted they
held prejudices against homosexuals. The trial court was not convinced by statements
from both jurors that they would be able to put aside their biases toward homosexuals.”);
Multimedia WMAZ, Inc. v. Kubach, 443 S.E.2d 491, 493, 496 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (con-
cluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excusing for cause three poten-
tial jurors “who expressed bias against homosexuals” in a case in which the plaintiff sued
a TV station for damages for making public the fact of his AIDS diagnosis); State v.
Murray, 375 So. 2d 80, 83 (La. 1979) (concluding that the trial court was within its
discretion to sustain the state’s challenge for cause to two prospective jurors who stated
that “under no circumstances would they believe the testimony of a homosexual”).
146 See United States v. Elfayoumi, 66 M.J. 354, 357 (C.A.A.F. 2008); see also, e.g.,
Loomis v. United States, 68 Fed. Cl. 503, 511–12 (Fed. Cl. 2005) (concluding that a
service member was not denied due process in a separation hearing under “Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell,” when potential jurors stated that they had religious or moral objections to
homosexuality, but that they could put aside those feelings to judge the evidence); People
v. Simon, 100 P.3d 487, 494–95 (Colo. App. 2004) (acknowledging that “this juror’s
comments about homosexuality were troubling, especially given the nature of the case,”
but nonetheless concluding that the trial court’s acceptance of the juror’s assurance that
“she would base her decision on the evidence and the court’s instructions on the law,”
rather than her religious beliefs, “was not manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair”);
Baker v. State, 498 S.E.2d 290, 292 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (“A belief in God’s ultimate
judgment does not automatically preclude a person from fairly and impartially sitting in
judgment of others based upon the laws of the commonwealth.”); Turner v. Common-
wealth, 153 S.W.3d 823, 825–26, 833 (Ky. 2005), overruled on other grounds by Padgett
v. Commonwealth, 312 S.W.3d 336 (Ky. 2010) (rejecting the claim by the lesbian defen-
dant in a murder, burglary, and theft case that the trial court erred in refusing to strike
four jurors for cause when the jurors stated that they believed homosexuality was wrong
but that they could be fair); People v. Rodriguez-Arango, No. 297065, 2011 WL
4467680, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2011) (rejecting the claim that trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to exercise peremptory strikes to remove jurors who expressed
disapproval of homosexuality). In Rodriguez-Arango, the Michigan court reasoned:
A juror is impartial if the juror can lay aside any impressions or opinions and
render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court. The first juror clearly
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times involve “rehabilitative” questioning, in which judges ask jurors who
have expressed biases whether they can put them aside.147
For example, in 2008, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
concluded that “the military judge did not abuse his discretion in denying a
challenge for cause” in a case alleging a same-sex sexual assault when a
prospective juror indicated that he disapproved of homosexuality on moral
grounds, but that he could put aside his feelings.148 The colloquy between the
trial court and the juror was as follows:
MJ: Earlier you indicated you had some strong objections to
homosexuality?
MEM: That is correct, sir.
MJ: Could you explain a little bit about that.
MEM: I feel that it is morally wrong. It is against what I believe
as a Christian and I do have some strong opinions against it.
MJ: You notice[] on the [charge sheet] that the word “homo-
sexual” is not there?
MEM: Yes, sir.
MJ: But there are male on male sexual touchings alleged.
MEM: Yes, sir.
MJ: Do you think, with your moral beliefs that you can fairly
evaluate the evidence of this case given the nature of the
allegations?
MEM: Yes, sir.
MJ: Let’s say we get to sentencing and the accused is convicted
of some or all of the [offenses] . . . . Let’s talk about these of-
fenses involving indecent assault and the forcible sodomy. If it got
to that point in the trial and the accused was convicted of some or
all of those offenses, do you think you could fairly consider the
full range of punishments?
MEM: Yes, sir.
stated that she believed homosexuality is wrong, but she also stated that she
would not assume that defendant was guilty simply because of his homosexuality.
The second juror expressly stated that he was a Christian and did not believe in
homosexuality, but that he could set aside his religious beliefs and would work
hard to reach a fair and impartial decision. Thus, both jurors made statements
indicating that they could set aside their opinions on homosexuality and render a
verdict based on the evidence.
Id. (citation omitted); see also State v. Miller, 476 S.E.2d 535, 552–53 (W. Va. 1996)
(concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to strike jurors
who expressed homophobic attitudes for cause, when jurors stated that they could be fair
despite disapproval of same-sex sexuality).
147 See Crocker & Kovera, supra note 72, at 213 (“[J]udges may rehabilitate R
venirepersons who hold biases that would otherwise render them ineligible for jury
service.”).
148 Elfayoumi, 66 M.J. at 355, 357.
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MJ: Do you think you could honestly consider not discharging
the accused even with that kind of conviction?
MEM: I would have a hard time with that, sir.
MJ: Could you consider it though?
MEM: Yes, sir.
MJ: After hearing the entire case, you wouldn’t [categorically]
exclude that?
MEM: No, sir.
MJ: Now understanding there may be administrative[] conse-
quences and we all know those, but as a court member, that’s not
your concern. Do you understand that?
MEM: Yes, sir.149
More recently, in the 2012 federal hate crimes prosecution in Kentucky,
Jenkins, eleven prospective jurors expressed disapproval of homosexual-
ity.150 A number of prospective jurors who said they could be fair despite
their disapproval of homosexuality were not challenged for cause.151 The
court did excuse for cause four jurors who stated expressly that they could
not be fair because of their negative feelings about gays and bisexuals,152 one
juror who “hesitated” in responding “probably, yes,” when asked if she
149 Id. at 355 (alterations in original) (footnote omitted).
150 See, e.g., Jenkins Transcript of Record, supra note 79, at 124–25 (“I have a nega- R
tive preference [against gays and bisexuals] . . . I’m opposed to gay activity . . . .”); id. at
139 (“I have a problem with it as far as being wrong; it’s wrong. I know that.”); id. at 141
(“I’ve got just personal beliefs. I just don’t think that it’s right to be that way . . . .”).
151 For instance, there was no challenge for cause against the juror who stated that he
had a “negative preference” against gays and bisexuals and was “opposed to gay activ-
ity,” but who responded affirmatively when asked if he could “put any bias or prefer-
ences [he had] aside and be fair and impartial.” Id. at 124–25. Nor was there a challenge
for cause against jurors who stated, “it’s wrong,” id. at 139; “I just don’t think that it’s
right to be that way,” id. at 141; “my religious belief is the biggest issue I have, and . . .
it’s not an issue with the case. It’s just something that would not be for me,” id. at 226;
and “another trial might be easier. But like I said before, I would put my personal feel-
ings aside and go by the law,” id. at 278. There was also no challenge for cause against a
juror who stated that, “I have friends I know that are that way,” but that he was opposed
to federal hate crimes legislation because he felt the federal government had “more im-
portant things . . . to be doing,” and that he did not know it was a “big federal law if you
assault because of [their sexual orientation].” Id. at 258–60.
152 The court excused for cause a juror who said she had “religious beliefs” and
“religious point of views” about homosexuality, and that she “would like to hope” she
wouldn’t treat someone gay or bisexual differently, and that she “would like to hope that
[she] could be fair,” but that she had not “had enough experience in that area” to know
for sure how she would react. Id. at 155–59, 319–20. A juror who stated that she believed
“it’s wrong,” and who responded “probably so” to the question whether “it would be
difficult for you to be fair in a case like this,” also was struck for cause. Id. at 206–07,
324. Jurors were also excused for cause when they responded affirmatively that it would
be difficult for them to put aside their feelings and follow the instructions in the case
because of their feelings about gays and lesbians, id. at 222, 323–24; and that “I’ve never
been around anyone like that [LGBT],” and “I do not understand any of that, so it would
make me a little impartial” and be hard to predict how he would react, id. at 245, 248,
323.
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could put aside moral feelings about gays and lesbians in judging the facts,153
and one juror who stated that “there ain’t no place in heaven [for gays and
lesbians], and “the Bible says stay away from those kind of people.”154
Other jurors (not counted in the eleven referred to above) were removed for
cause because they said that their opposition to federal hate crimes legisla-
tion for gays and lesbians meant they would not be able to follow the court’s
instructions or be fair.155 Four jurors who expressed strong personal feelings
regarding same-sex sexuality (typically disapproval) were removed by per-
emptory strikes, which both parties conducted simultaneously off-the-re-
cord.156 One who said, “[I]t’s wrong. I know that,” sat on the jury.157
In the Jenkins trial, rehabilitative questioning took place during the voir
dire of jurors who stated they had personal views about homosexuality. For
example, one prospective juror, when asked whether she “might have a ten-
dency to treat somebody who is gay or bisexual differently than someone
else, it could be more positively, it could be more negatively, but that you
would treat them different than someone else,” responded in part, “I would
have to really put my personal feelings aside and know that I couldn’t judge
them on that. But I would have to dig deep within to decide.”158 The court
then asked, “is there any reason that . . . those views . . . would make [it]
difficult for you to be fair or impartial to either side here?”159 The juror
responded, “It would be a struggle. It would be difficult. It wouldn’t be im-
possible, but it would be a personal struggle.”160 The court then asked
153 The court permitted a challenge for cause “out of an abundance of caution”
against a prospective juror who responded “[y]es” to the question, “Do you have a kind
of an ethical or a moral feeling about homosexuality?” and who, when asked whether she
could “put that aside and be fair and impartial in this case,” responded, “Probably, yes.”
Id. at 129–30, 327.
154 Id. at 162–65, 332.
155 Id. at 241–42, 279–80, 318, 323.
156 After challenges for cause were exercised, the court clerk randomly selected a
pool of thirty-three jurors. Id. at 339. These four jurors were included in that pool of
thirty-three. Id. at 339–40. The attorneys then exercised their peremptory strikes (a total
of nineteen for both sides combined) simultaneously off the record. Id. at 337–38, 349.
The court clerk then called the numbers of fourteen jurors who would comprise the
jury—twelve jurors and two alternates. Id. at 349. These four jurors were not included in
the final fourteen, and so presumably were eliminated through peremptory challenges.
See id. at 337–52. The four included a juror who stated he had a “negative preference
toward gays” and that he was “opposed to gay activity,” id. at 124–25; one who stated “I
just don’t think it’s right to be that way,” id. at 141; a juror who said he had a “religious
belief” against gays and lesbians and hesitated in saying that he could put that aside, id.
at 226–27; and one juror who stated that “it would be a personal struggle” to be fair and
impartial in this case given personal feelings about gays and lesbians, id. at 276–78.
157 The juror who sat on the jury stated, “I have a problem with it [being gay or
lesbian] as far as being wrong; it’s wrong. I know that.” Id. at 139, 349. In response to
follow-up questioning from the court during voir dire, the juror also stated, “But as far as
abuse of that person, that ain’t right either,” and responded “no” when asked whether
there was “[a]nything about your personal view about homosexuality that would make it
difficult . . . to be fair and impartial to both sides in this particular case?” Id. at 139–40.
158 Id. at 276.
159 Id. at 276–77.
160 Id. at 277.
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whether she could “focus on the evidence presented in court” and “apply
the law as I give it to you.”161 The juror responded, “Yes.”162 The court
asked, “Do you think you could follow those instructions?”163 The juror re-
sponded, “I would have to.”164 During discussion of possible challenges for
cause, one defense attorney stated, “I think she rehabilitated actually very
nicely.”165 The juror was not challenged for cause,166 and ultimately was re-
moved through a peremptory strike.167
Jurors express similar beliefs in “blue” states too. In one 2009 Massa-
chusetts prosecution alleging a homicide in the context of a same-sex rela-
tionship,168 the following exchange occurred during voir dire, again
illustrating rehabilitative questioning:
The Court: [T]here may be evidence in the case that the alleged
victim and the defendant engaged in a sexual relationship and that
the alleged victim may have engaged in a sexual relationship with
other men. Anything about the defendant or the alleged victim’s
sexual orientation that you think would get in the way of your
ability to be fair?
Juror: I am a born again Christian, and the word of God speaks on
homosexuality, and that it is sinful behavior.
The Court: Would that affect your ability to be fair in deciding the
facts of this case?
Juror: I would try to be as fair as I could be, yes.
The Court: Do you think that . . . [y]our religious beliefs, do you
think that your religious beliefs about homosexuality would im-
pact how you decide what happened in this case if there’s evidence
of homosexuality?
Juror: If you’re asking me if that would confuse my understanding
of the facts, I would have to say it would not.
The Court: I’m glad you asked for a clarification because that’s not
what I’m saying. If you’re a juror, jurors come to cases with all sort
of attitudes, opinions, views, morals, religious, political. We don’t
expect jurors to come in here with no views of the world. That . . .
wouldn’t be a very good system of justice.
The question is whether a juror’s particular view of the world,
such as your religious views, would get in the way of your ability
to decide what happened in this case from the evidence and follow
the instructions of law. It may be for some people in your position
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 328.
166 Id. at 327–28.
167 See id. at 340, 349.
168 Commonwealth v. Almonte, 988 N.E.2d 415, 417–18 (Mass. 2013).
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that it would, maybe in some people in your position that it
wouldn’t. The question is whether you can compartmentalize your
mind and decide the facts of this case separate and distinct from
what your own personal political or religious views might be or
whether you think that might be the prism through which you de-
cide what happened.
Juror: I think that I would be able to fairly make a decision based
on the facts.
The Court: Okay.169
At a side bar conference, the judge found the prospective juror “indifferent,”
declining to excuse her for cause.170 The defense then exercised a peremp-
tory challenge to excuse the venireperson.171
As these examples demonstrate, it is possible that someone who ex-
presses gay-negative beliefs may in fact survive a challenge for cause, if the
trial court is confident that the juror can follow instructions and be fair.
Questions like those asked in the Jenkins and Almonte cases, which focus on
whether jurors can put aside their anti-gay feelings to be “fair” or “impar-
tial,” are likely to elicit responses that jurors believe they can be fair. As
psychologists Caroline Crocker and Margaret Kovera have explained, “Peo-
ple want to believe that they can be fair and are unlikely to admit that they
cannot set aside their biases.”172 Arguably, all but the most self-aware—or
stridently homophobic—would likely assert that they could put aside their
disapproval of gays in judging the facts of the case. For this reason, the U.S.
Supreme Court has emphasized that a trial court is not supposed to accept
“venire members who proclaim[ ] their impartiality at their word,” but is
also entrusted with evaluating their “demeanor and credibility.”173
As a normative matter, it seems wrong to permit jurors who express
strong anti-gay attitudes to serve in cases presenting LGBT issues.174 It is
hard to imagine a situation in which a prospective juror who said that she
believed that a particular racial or ethnic group was morally inferior would
be permitted to remain on the jury so long as she promised to put aside those
feelings in evaluating the evidence.175 Four Justices of the U.S. Supreme
169 Almonte Transcript of Record, supra note 142, at 167–69. R
170 Id. at 169–70.
171 Id. at 170.
172 Crocker & Kovera, supra note 72, at 213. R
173 Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2923 (2010).
174 But see Clemens, supra note 38, at 100–01 (arguing that the prosecution may “set R
itself up for reversal” if it successfully challenges for cause “a venire member who only
felt that homosexuality was against God’s law,” because this arguably would in effect
give the prosecution an additional peremptory challenge, but also recognizing that requir-
ing a gay defendant to expend a peremptory challenge on a juror who expresses anti-gay
bias may “prematurely exhaust[ ] a defendant’s peremptory challenges”).
175 Cf. Taylor Flynn, Clarion Call or False Alarm: Why Proposed Exemptions to
Equal Marriage Statutes Return Us to a Religious Understanding of the Public Market-
place, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 236, 248–49 (2010) (discussing the debate about whether
anti-gay beliefs are like racism). But see Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 176 (1986)
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Court have noted that belief in the moral inferiority of a racial group could
cause jurors to be “influenced” by their “less consciously held racial atti-
tudes” during the capital sentencing process.176 Jurors who express strong
gay-negative beliefs should be removed from juries in cases involving
LGBT issues and/or people, regardless of whether those attitudes are rooted
in religious beliefs, and even if the venireperson asserts that she can be fair
despite her beliefs.
However, this is one way in which the law addressing juror
homophobia differs from the law governing racial bias at the present time.
Given the current state of the law, prevailing social attitudes in many re-
gions, and the fact that peremptory strikes are limited, litigants sometimes
may be stuck with such “explicit-but-fair” homonegative jurors, and advo-
cates may have to help educate these jurors about how to monitor their own
anti-gay biases in deliberations.177
B. “Closet” Homonegativity:178 Voir Dire for Bias and
Peremptory Challenges
Many jurors will not admit to anti-gay biases, even though they may
hold them,179 and others may be unaware of such biases.180 Social science
provides particularly helpful insight into questions that are likely to uncover
anti-gay bias. Some of these indirect strategies may prove more effective
than attempts to question jurors directly about their attitudes toward
gayness.181
(“[T]hose who firmly believe that the death penalty is unjust may nevertheless serve as
jurors in capital cases so long as they state clearly that they are willing to temporarily set
aside their own beliefs in deference to the rule of law.”).
176 Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 35 (1986) (plurality opinion) (“[A] juror who
believes that blacks are violence prone or morally inferior might well be influenced by
that belief in deciding whether petitioner’s crime involved the aggravating factors speci-
fied under Virginia law. Such a juror might also be less favorably inclined toward peti-
tioner’s evidence of mental disturbance as a mitigating circumstance. More subtle, less
consciously held racial attitudes could also influence a juror’s decision in this case. Fear
of blacks, which could easily be stirred up by the violent facts of petitioner’s crime, might
incline a juror to favor the death penalty.”).
177 Cf. Lee, The Gay Panic Defense, supra note 31, at 556 (“[E]ven prejudiced jurors R
can be encouraged to act in non-prejudiced ways. As discussed above, when non-
prejudiced norms are made salient by the expression of positive opinions on gay-related
issues, both low and high-prejudice subjects report less prejudiced opinions about gay
men.”).
178 Id. at 561 (discussing the term “closet homophobe”).
179 See Clemens, supra note 38, at 97 (recognizing that “[p]otential jurors may not R
be entirely forthcoming about their anti-gay bias, particularly when questioned about
anti-gay bias in front of other jurors,” and suggesting that “[t]his problem can some-
times be rectified through individual, detailed questioning”).
180 See Crocker & Kovera, supra note 72, at 212 (“Some venirepersons may be una- R
ware of their prejudices, as people often lack insight into the factors that influence their
behavior.” (citation omitted)).
181 But see Kraus & Ragatz, supra note 39, at 255–56 (suggesting that attorney’s R
attempt to gauge homophobia among prospective jurors by asking them directly, “In your
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Research has identified a number of factors that predict gay-negative
attitudes. Studies demonstrate a relationship between lack of contact with
gays and lesbians and anti-gay attitudes.182 Researchers attempting to gauge
homonegativity have used questions such as, “Have you ever had any
friends or relatives who are gay, lesbian, or bisexual . . . ?”183 However, jury
consultant Sean Overland cautions that, “While having a gay friend affects
people’s views on homosexuality, simply knowing someone who is gay, or
having a gay relative, does not.”184
Research also shows that people who believe that being gay is a choice
tend to demonstrate more gay-negative attitudes.185 Academics have asked
subjects to rate their agreement with the statement, “I believe homosexuality
is primarily a personal choice,” using a six-point Likert scale ranging from
“strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.”186
Other important indicators of homonegative attitudes are political ideol-
ogy187 and religiosity,188 although caveats regarding voir dire questions about
religion follow in Part II.C.189 Jurors who identify as “politically conserva-
tive” tend to have more anti-gay attitudes than politically liberal or moderate
jurors.190 Overland writes that “jurors who try to attend religious services
every week tend to be more homophobic than jurors who do not,” and that
“[j]urors who report that their religious beliefs are ‘often important’ or ‘al-
ways important’ in guiding their daily decisions tend to be more homophobic
than jurors for whom religious beliefs are only ‘sometimes important’ or
‘never important’ to their daily decisions.”191
In her 2008 article, The Gay Panic Defense, Professor Cynthia Lee
made a significant contribution in this area by drawing on implicit social
cognition research to describe means of identifying anti-gay bias in voir dire,
as well as techniques to help guard against the influence of implicit anti-gay
opinion, should the sexual orientation of the defendant influence the treatment s/he re-
ceives in the legal system?” and “Do you have any biases or prejudices that might pre-
vent you from judging this case fairly given that it involves a gay victim?” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
182 See Jill M. Chonody, Measuring Sexual Prejudice Against Gay Men and Lesbian
Women: Development of the Sexual Prejudice Scale (SPS), 60 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 895,
900, 917 (2013).
183 Id. at 905.
184 Overland, supra note 33, at 4. R
185 Chonody, supra note 182, at 900, 917. R
186 Id. at 905.
187 See Overland, supra note 33, at 4; Lee, The Gay Panic Defense, supra note 31, at R
562 (discussing Drury Sherrod & Peter M. Nardi, Homophobia in the Courtroom: An
Assessment of Biases Against Gay Men and Lesbians in a Multiethnic Sample of Potential
Jurors, in STIGMA AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION: UNDERSTANDING PREJUDICE AGAINST LES-
BIANS, GAY MEN, AND BISEXUALS 24, 27 (Gregory M. Herek ed., 1998)).
188 Overland, supra note 33, at 3. R
189 See infra Part II.C.
190 Overland, supra note 33, at 4. R
191 Id. at 3.
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bias in deliberations.192 Lee discussed “proxy or surrogate” questions pro-
posed by Drury Sherrod and Peter Nardi to uncover homophobia:
Do you have any close friends who are gay or lesbian?
Politically, are you liberal, middle-of-the-road, or conservative?
How important are your religious beliefs in guiding your daily
decisions?
Do you think the world would be a better place if more people
followed old-fashioned values?
Do you try to attend religious services at your church or temple
every week?
Are federal and state governments doing enough to make sure in-
dustry does not pollute the environment we live in?
How thoroughly do you read your local newspaper every day?
Please tell me the postal ZIP code where you live.
What is your current marital status?
What is your religion?
Have you ever served in the U.S. Armed Forces?
Do you feel your life is more controlled by fate than by planning?
Do you read any magazines on a regular basis?
What is your highest level of education?193
Overland made similar suggestions in a 2009 article.194 As a tactical
matter, Overland cautioned that direct questions about attitudes toward
same-sex marriage or gay civil rights might make gay-friendly jurors a target
of peremptory challenges by opposing counsel.195 He recommended limiting
direct questions about attitudes toward LGBT issues to those that are rela-
tively non-controversial, thereby exposing the jurors with strong anti-gay
beliefs, while not “outing” potential allies.196 Writing in 2009, Overland rec-
ommended the following questions:
Would you feel bothered if a gay or lesbian couple moved in
next door to you?
192 Lee, The Gay Panic Defense, supra note 31, at 562–63; see also Perkiss, supra R
note 16, at 820–23. R
193 Lee, The Gay Panic Defense, supra note 31, at 562–63.
194 Overland, supra note 33, at 3–4. R
195 Id. at 3.
196 Id. (“[A]ny juror who believes that gays and lesbians should have officially-
recognized marriages, or who thinks that sexual orientation should be a civil right, be-
comes a target for a peremptory challenge by the opposition.”). Of course, just a few
years later, support for same-sex marriage is much more mainstream, at least in certain
areas of the country. See, e.g., ANDREW R. FLORES & SCOTT BARCLAY, THE WILLIAMS
INSTITUTE, PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR MARRIAGE FOR SAME-SEX COUPLES BY STATE 3 (2013),
archived at http://perma.cc/8E93-33HP (noting support for same-sex marriage as high as
62% in the District of Columbia). Questions about same-sex marriage might elicit
favorable responses from a higher percentage of the jury pool, thus creating less of a
danger of “outing” friendly jurors.
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Do you think employers should be able to refuse to hire
someone because of his or her sexual orientation?
Would you feel bothered if you had to work closely with
someone who was gay or lesbian?197
Researchers have worked since at least the 1970s to develop scales to
measure homophobia.198 In 2013, Jill Chonody, an Australian professor, pub-
lished a study validating a sexual prejudice scale.199 Chonody’s scale in-
cludes separate questions measuring negative attitudes toward gay men and
lesbians.200 Subjects are asked to rate their reactions to statements on the
Likert scale.201 Chonody’s “sexual prejudice scale” includes statements mea-
suring three sub-scales: (1) stereotyping (e.g., “[m]ost gay men are promis-
cuous” and “[m]ost lesbians prefer to dress like men”); (2) affective-
valuation (e.g., “[i]t’s wrong for men to have sex with men” and
“[l]esbians are confused about their sexuality”); and (3) social equality be-
liefs (e.g., “[h]ealth care benefits should include partners of gay male em-
ployees” (reverse-scored) and “[l]esbians want too many rights”).202
Consistent with the relatively indirect methods described by Overland, ques-
tions measuring “social equality beliefs” from Chonody’s “sexual prejudice
scale” and similar instruments could be used to measure prospective jurors’
anti-gay attitudes.
C. Potential Collision Course: Voir Dire on Religion
Social science cannot necessarily translate directly into the courtroom.
Research demonstrates that religiosity is correlated with gay-negative atti-
tudes,203 and proxy questions such as, “What is your religion?” and “Do you
try to attend religious services at your church or temple every week?”204 may
be effective in predicting anti-gay bias. However, some of these questions
197 Id. (“In an average jury venire, relatively few people (10 to 20%) will answer
‘yes’ to these questions. A ‘yes’ answer therefore gives valuable information about anti-
gay attitudes, while a ‘no’ answer gives the opposition little usable information.”).
198 See Chonody, supra note 182, at 898 (discussing earlier measures of homophobia, R
including those addressed in Gregory M. Herek’s 1984 study, Attitudes Toward Lesbians
and Gay Men: A Factor-Analytic Study, 10 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 39).
199 Id. at 895.
200 Id. at 901.
201 Id. at 902 (explaining that “[t]he forced-choice Likert scale” is commonly used
for “measuring a socially undesirable attitude because respondents cannot avoid a diffi-
cult response by choosing a neutral option,” suggesting that the format might be useful
for juror questionnaires).
202 Id. at 913.
203 Id. at 900 (“[R]eligiosity has been shown to positively correlate with antigay
bias.” (citations omitted)).
204 Lee, The Gay Panic Defense, supra note 31, at 562–63. R
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may not be appropriate for the courtroom, and may even invite legal
challenges.205
The issue of whether the U.S. Constitution bars a litigant from exercis-
ing peremptory challenges based on a venire member’s religious affiliation
(as opposed to religious beliefs) is an open question.206 In 1994, the U.S.
Supreme Court denied certiorari in a case that presented this issue, over a
dissent by Justices Thomas and Scalia.207 Lower federal courts remain
split,208 and commentators continue to debate the topic.209 Some states have
prohibited the exercise of peremptory challenges based on religion210—in-
cluding the “blue” states of Connecticut and Massachusetts.211
Challenges to peremptory strikes based on religious affiliation some-
times involve the protection of religious minorities, which can overlap with
racial and ethnic groups that face discrimination.212 As a result, some of the
205 See Hinkle, supra note 34, at 192 (discussing possible legal challenges that could R
follow if it appears that a lawyer has struck a juror based on the juror’s religious
affiliation).
206 See id. at 141, 145–46 (describing how courts are split on the issue of religion-
based peremptory challenges, and arguing that the “Constitution forbids the use of per-
emptory challenges based solely on . . . stereotypes about religions but that a juror’s
actual stated beliefs are a proper basis for exclusion even if those beliefs are religiously
inspired”). The Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, which seeks to ensure that jury
venires for grand and petit juries reflect a randomly selected, fair cross section of the
population, prohibits exclusion from jury service on account of religion. 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1861, 1862, 1863 (2012) (“No citizen shall be excluded from service as a grand or
petit juror in the district courts of the United States or in the Court of International Trade
on account of race, color, religion, sex, national, origin, or economic status.”); see Grech
v. Wainwright, 492 F.2d 747, 749–50 (5th Cir. 1974) (concluding that excusing Jewish
venirepersons because the trial began on Yom Kippur did not violate the Act).
207 Davis v. Minnesota, 114 S. Ct. 2120, 2120–22 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari); see Hinkle, supra note 34, at 146 (pointing out that, in dissent- R
ing from the denial of certiorari in Davis, Justice Thomas argued that “religious-affilia-
tion-based peremptories were unconstitutional,” and that, in contrast, Justice Ginsburg,
concurring in the denial, “seemed to suggest that peremptories based on religious affilia-
tion were constitutional” (discussing Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2120–22)).
208 Hinkle, supra note 34, at 146 n.47 (citing federal court opinions split on the R
issue).
209 Id. at 146–47.
210 See id. at 146 n.48 (cataloguing state court decisions on each side of the split).
211 State v. Hodge, 726 A.2d 531, 553–54 (Conn. 1999) (concluding “that the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States constitution prohibits
the exercise of a peremptory challenge to excuse a venireperson because of his or her
religious affiliation,” but also that the peremptory challenge at issue in the case was not
based on religious affiliation and that the prosecutor’s questioning about the venireper-
son’s membership in the Nation of Islam was to determine whether the prospective juror
could follow the court’s instructions); Commonwealth v. Carleton, 629 N.E.2d 321, 325
(Mass. App. Ct. 1994) (“The use of peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors
solely because of bias presumed to derive from their membership in discrete community
groups based on creed or national origin is prohibited by art. 12 of the Massachusetts
Declaration of Rights.” (citation omitted)); see also infra notes 289–93 (discussing Colo- R
rado, Oregon, and Minnesota juror nondiscrimination statutes that include religion as a
protected category).
212 See Hinkle, supra note 34, at 139, 172–73, 194 & n. 213 (discussing a prosecu- R
tor’s peremptory strike of an African American juror that was justified on the basis that he
looked like a Muslim, which was upheld by the D.C. Circuit). Hinkle writes, “The per-
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proxy questions designed by Sherrod and Nardi and offered by Lee to ferret
out LGBT bias are on a potential collision course with other protected cate-
gories. Social science and statistics might suggest it is strategically prudent
to remove jurors who are members of religious denominations that are not
LGBT-inclusive. However, challenges based on religious identity alone may
run afoul of constitutional or other state law protections.
To be clear, the proxy questions that may raise red flags focus on relig-
ious affiliation, not religious belief. As Daniel Hinkle has succinctly ex-
plained, “a person’s beliefs can be taken into account in determining his
fitness to serve on a jury, regardless of whether those beliefs are grounded in
a religion,” because “jury service is an unusual situation in which a person’s
opinions and beliefs are legitimately relevant to his relationship with the
government.”213 For that reason, the Sherrod and Nardi proxy question,
“How important are your religious beliefs in guiding your daily deci-
sions?”214 may in fact be an appropriate voir dire question in some circum-
stances. For example, if a juror has offered that she disapproves of same-sex
sexuality based on the teachings of her church (as many did in the Jenkins
case), it is perfectly appropriate to probe whether she can put those beliefs
aside in judging the facts of the case.215
This tension reflects a broader clash of worldviews that is particularly
evident in the debate over marriage equality.216 While many advocates and
commentators believe we are witnessing a new civil rights movement that
reflects a “sea change” in public attitudes toward LGBT sexuality,217 others
warn of an attack on religious freedom.218 These are themes that have played
centage of cases reviewing peremptory challenges based on religious affiliation that
originated when the prosecutor was accused of basing his peremptory on race and re-
sponded by stating that religion was the reason is strikingly high.” Id. at 169 (footnote
omitted).
213 Id. at 148–49. Hinkle discusses court cases and concludes that, “peremptories
based on an actual stated religious belief, like any other belief, do not violate Batson.” Id.
at 185–87.
214 Lee, The Gay Panic Defense, supra note 31, at 563. R
215 See Hinkle, supra note 34, at 148–49, 185. R
216 See Chai R. Feldblum, Moral Conflict and Conflicting Liberties, in SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS 123, 123–25 (Douglas Lay-
cock, Anthony R. Picarello, Jr. & Robin Fretwell Wilson eds., 2008); Douglas NeJaime,
Marriage Inequality: Same-Sex Relationships, Religious Exemptions, and the Production
of Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1169, 1180 (2012) (“Debates
over marriage for same-sex couples increasingly focus on religious liberty issues.”).
217 This debate occurred in a condensed form during an exchange that Roberta
Kaplan, the lawyer for plaintiff-respondent Edith Windsor in the challenge to the Defense
of Marriage Act (DOMA), had with Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia regarding
Congress’ intent in passing DOMA in 1996. Transcript of Oral Argument at 2, 105–06,
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307) [hereinafter Windsor
Transcript of Oral Argument]. Justice Scalia expressed skepticism, asking whether “there
has been this sea change between now and 1996,” and Ms. Kaplan responded, “I think
with respect to the understanding of gay people and their relationships there has been a
sea change, Your Honor.” Id. at 106.
218 Compare NeJaime, supra note 216, at 1172–80 (discussing and critiquing so- R
called “marriage conscience protection” provisions proposed by religious liberty scholars
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out in debates about photographers, florists, and wedding cakes.219 They
could surface in jury selection as well, an arena in which venirepersons are
summoned to appear and answer questions, where the competing constitu-
tional interests are even weightier, and where much is at stake for litigants.
On this shifting terrain, for litigants or advocates who view themselves
as part of an LGBT rights movement, voir dire questions that focus on relig-
ious affiliation (as opposed to religious beliefs) arguably carry a heavy cost.
Striking jurors based on religious affiliation potentially could entrench divi-
sions and contribute to people of faith feeling marginalized,220 whether legit-
imate or not, which may prove unhelpful to the LGBT rights movement.
Questions about religious affiliation also arguably reinforce a false dichot-
omy between LGBT equality and faith,221 and contribute to inaccurate gener-
alizations about people with a tie to a major world religion.222 Moreover,
in the marriage equality debate), with Richard W. Garnett, Worth Worrying About: Same-
Sex Marriage & Religious Freedom, COMMONWEAL (Aug. 5, 2013), https://www.com-
monwealmagazine.org/worth-worrying-about&sa=D&usg=ALhdy2-CKGGG1idPLKD
kDajISRZqZot2Sw, archived at http://perma.cc/7KZH-ZGYN (arguing that “the dangers
posed by the legal redefinition of marriage are real”).
219 See, e.g., Elane Photography v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 77 (N.M. 2013) (concluding
that a photographer’s refusal to photograph a same-sex commitment ceremony constitutes
sexual-orientation discrimination in violation of the New Mexico Human Rights Act);
Oregon Bakery Owner Aaron Klein Denies Lesbian Couple a Wedding Cake, HUF-
FINGTON POST (Feb. 5, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/04/aaron-klein-or-
egon-bakery-owner-lesbian-wedding-cake_n_2615563.html, archived at http://perma.cc/
JT84-THVM; Allison Terry, Florist Sued Again for Refusing to Provide Flowers for Gay
Wedding, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, (Apr. 19, 2013), http://www.csmonitor.com/
USA/USA-Update/2013/0419/Florist-sued-again-for-refusing-to-provide-flowers-for-
gay-wedding, archived at http://perma.cc/6ZQJ-UGKY.
220 NeJaime cites a Wall Street Journal piece written by Professor Mary Ann Glendon
as one example of this rhetoric: “Every person and every religion that disagrees [with
same-sex marriage] will be labeled as bigoted and openly discriminated against.”
NeJaime, supra note 216, at 1182 (quoting Mary Ann Glendon, For Better or for Worse?,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 2004, at A14); see also Flynn, supra note 175, at 240 (discussing R
claims of marginalization or victimization by religious opponents of gay rights).
221 See generally JAY MICHAELSON, GOD VS. GAY?: THE RELIGIOUS CASE FOR
EQUALITY (2011) (making religious arguments for LGBT equality); Faith, NAT’L GAY &
LESBIAN TASK FORCE, http://www.thetaskforce.org/issues/faith (last visited Feb. 2, 2014),
archived at http://perma.cc/3B8B-CZRG (discussing how to build welcoming religious
congregations and amplify “the voices of faith leaders to counter religiously-based big-
otry”); Flynn, supra note 175, at 237 (“[The] common presentation of the issue [as R
“Gay Rights versus Religious Freedom”] ignores that many religious faiths support
same-sex marriage as a matter of theology, that many gay people are members of relig-
ious faiths, and that many of us are strong supporters of religious liberty.”). One sup-
porter of the Minnesota same-sex marriage law emphasized the presence of LGBT people
in faith communities as an important ingredient in the movement for legal equality: “It
was only a matter of time before people would realize that we’re just folks—we’re in
people’s congregations, we’re in the grocery stores, we’re everywhere.” Monica Davey,
Minnesota Senate Clears Way for Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2013), http:/
/www.nytimes.com/2013/11/06/us/illinois-sends-bill-allowing-gay-marriage-to-governor.
html&sa=D&usg=ALhdy2-9l8mZXV1CYgA20Q8OPtkgWWZ3Jg, archived at http://
perma.cc/6GTX-EFQW (emphasis added).
222 See Frank Bruni, Op-Ed., Religion Beyond the Right, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/07/opinion/bruni-religion-beyond-the-right.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/7TJF-FSZD (“We refer incessantly in this country to the ‘re-
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such questions could alienate potential allies.223 Although a lawyer might be
able to make statistical predictions about a venireperson’s beliefs based on
religious affiliation, such questions could run the risk of reifying stereotypes
at a time when attitudes are rapidly changing.224 While the Vatican might still
oppose same-sex marriage, and gays who marry continue to be fired from
Catholic institutions,225 recent polling demonstrates that more than half of
American Catholics support same-sex marriage, a higher rate than the rate
that exists in the general voting population.226 Over half of more devout
Catholics—those who attend religious services about once every week—
also support same-sex marriage.227
Instead of focusing on religious affiliation, litigants might instead focus
on other “proxy” areas, such as asking jurors about their attitudes toward
traditional institutions and roles. For example, Sherrod and Nardi suggest the
question, “Do you think the world would be a better place if more people
followed old-fashioned values?”228 Other relatively non-controversial Sher-
rod and Nardi proxy questions are: “Politically, are you liberal, middle-of-
the-road, or conservative?” and “Do you read any magazines on a regular
basis?”229
Another tack is to focus more on jurors’ level of contact with gays and
lesbians,230 by posing a variant of the Sherrod and Nardi question, “Do you
have any close friends who are gay or lesbian?”231 Recent examples demon-
ligious right,’ a phrase routinely presented as if it’s some sort of syllogism . . . . But there’s
a religious center. A religious left. There are Christian moderates and Christian liberals:
less alliterative and less dogmatic, but perhaps no less concerned with acting in ways that
reflect moral ideals. We should better acknowledge that and them.”).
223 See Hinkle, supra note 34, at 176 (“[A] Catholic might be injured by the assump- R
tion that she is pro-life because she is offended by the notion that all Catholics think
alike, even on topics for which the Catholic Church has an official position.”).
224 See, e.g., Second High-Profile Methodist Minister Charged with Officiating Gay
Son’s Wedding, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/
national/high-profile-methodist-minister-charged-officiating-gay-son-wedding-article-
1.1583351, archived at http://perma.cc/HXY6-LB6M (describing how Methodist minis-
ters are being charged with officiating at same-sex marriages, which violates church pol-
icy); Kyle Spencer, A Rainbow over Catholic Colleges: How Georgetown Became a Gay-
Friendly Campus, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/04/edu-
cation/edlife/how-georgetown-became-a-gay-friendly-campus.html, archived at http://
perma.cc/4YBC-SLA3 (describing increasingly gay-friendly campus life at Georgetown).
225 Michael Paulson, Gay Marriages Confront Catholic School Rules, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 22, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/23/us/gay-marriages-confront-catholic-
school-rules.html, archived at http://perma.cc/VJ3T-5KRJ.
226 Press Release, Quinnipiac University Polling Institute, U.S. Catholics Back Pope
on Changing Church Focus, Quinnipiac University National Poll Finds; Catholics Support
Gay Marriage, Women Priests 2-1 (Oct. 4, 2013) (finding that 60% of American
Catholics support same-sex marriage, compared with 56% of the voting public), archived
at http://perma.cc/M67B-7FCA.
227 Id. (finding that 53% of Catholics who attend religious services about once every
week support same-sex marriage).
228 Lee, The Gay Panic Defense, supra note 31, at 563. R
229 Id. at 562–63.
230 See Chonody, supra note 182, at 900, 905. R
231 Lee, The Gay Panic Defense, supra note 31, at 562. R
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strate that this is an area in which the social science tracks popular wisdom.
As Senator Rob Portman’s story illustrates, having a close friend or relative
who is gay can affect even an avowed conservative’s views on gay rights.232
Edith Windsor (the plaintiff-respondent in the DOMA case) said of the Sen-
ator’s about-face, “That’s how everybody who’s not gay decides to support
gay marriage. They discover that somebody they know and love is gay, and
they say, ‘Oh, Jesus, I had no idea.’” 233 In social science terms, this phenom-
enon is described as “expos[ure] . . . to countertypical associations.”234
Vexingly, this Sherrod and Nardi proxy question also illustrates how
voir dire designed to surface anti-gay bias also runs the risk of “outing”
prospective LGBT jurors or their friends and family members,235 raising the
concerns identified in Part III.236 The Sherrod and Nardi question stops short
of inquiring about the prospective juror’s own sexual history. Nonetheless, it
might increase the pressure on gay venirepersons to “come out” in voir dire,
demonstrating the interrelated aspects of these issues.
D. Surfacing Bias: An Effective Strategy
At least in the near future and in certain jurisdictions, some “explicit-
but-fair” and “closet” homophobes may remain on a jury,237 and research
confirms that all of us harbor implicit bias.238 For these reasons, the tech-
niques suggested by Lee and others for helping jurors monitor and reduce
the influence of anti-gay and anti-trans bias become all the more important.
Commentators agree that a bedrock principle in eliminating bias in the court-
room is to “[f]oreground social categories” in order to encourage jurors “to
232 See Rob Portman, Op-Ed., Gay Couples Also Deserve Chance to Get Married,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Mar. 15, 2013), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/editori-
als/2013/03/15/gay-couples-also-deserve-chance-to-get-married.html, archived at http://
perma.cc/YV93-6KAQ.
233 Andrew Goldman, Edith Windsor Takes Back What She Said About Topless Gay
Activists, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (May 3, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/05/maga-
zine/edith-windsor-takes-back-what-she-said-about-topless-gay-activists.html, archived
at http://perma.cc/X5NG-GF2C.
234 Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, supra note 126, at 1169–70 (“[I]f we R
have a negative attitude toward some group, we need exposure to members of that group
to whom we would have a positive attitude. . . . These exposures can come through direct
contact with countertypical people.”).
235 For example, during voir dire in the Jenkins case, a juror hesitated when asked
about her opinion about the federal hate crime statute, and started to say something about
her family members before breaking off. Jenkins Transcript of Record, supra note 79, at R
165–66. Defense counsel asked, “[W]as the hesitation about using the word ‘gay,’ or
was it a hesitation because you’re just unsure about whether or not a family member
might be?” The juror responded, “Well, I guess because they’re young right now; they
don’t understand what’s going on, but I had to think about his question to make sure I
answered it honestly.” Id. at 168.
236 See infra Part III.
237 Lee, The Gay Panic Defense, supra note 31, at 561–62 (using the terms “explicit” R
and “closet” homophobe).
238 Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, supra note 126, at 1128–35 (discuss- R
ing research on implicit biases).
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be conscious of race, gender, and other social categories” and to talk about
how those categories may be influencing their decision-making.239 As Lee
explains, “Social science research suggests that the use of mental imagery
can help reduce implicit bias in all individuals and that the first step to over-
coming implicit bias is awareness.”240 For example, Lee suggests “gender
and sexual orientation switching” exercises,241 a technique also advocated by
Bennett Capers,242 Alafair S. Burke,243 and others.244 In these exercises, the
jurors are asked to imagine the same scenario as in the case, but with the
genders or sexual orientations of the actors switched, and to self-monitor
whether they perceive the situation differently.245 These role-reversals could
be presented in opening statements and closing arguments, or given as a jury
instruction.246
Other commentators suggest juror education on implicit bias247 and the
use of special instructions.248 Prosecutors, judges, and appointed counsel also
may benefit from education on the effects of cognitive bias.249 Judge Mark
W. Bennett, a district court judge in the Northern District of Iowa,250 in-
structs jurors on implicit bias, including prior to opening statements, urging
them “to evaluate the evidence carefully and to resist jumping to conclu-
239 Id. at 1184; see also Lee, Making Race Salient, supra note 49, at 1586–1601 R
(discussing strategies based on social science for making race salient throughout a trial).
240 Lee, The Gay Panic Defense, supra note 31, at 565. R
241 Id. at 564.
242 Capers, supra note 18, at 1299–1300 (“[I]magining what decision would be ap- R
propriate for a female victim can aid decision makers in confronting and overriding im-
plicit biases they may have when dealing with a male victim.”).
243 Alafair S. Burke, Prosecutors and Peremptories, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1467, 1484–85
(advocating that prosecutors utilize “switching” exercises to become more aware of and
attempt to neutralize their own implicit cognitive bias in jury selection).
244 Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, supra note 126, at 1185 (advocating R
that jurors “[e]ngage in perspective shifting” by “shifting perspectives into the position
of the outgroup party, either plaintiff or defendant”).
245 Lee, The Gay Panic Defense, supra note 31, at 564. R
246 Id. at 564–65.
247 See Dale Larson, A Fair and Implicitly Impartial Jury: An Argument for Adminis-
tering the Implicit Association Test During Voir Dire, 3 DEPAUL J. SOC. JUST. 139,
166–69 (2010) (arguing that jurors should take the Implicit Association Test (IAT) in part
to help them gain self-awareness of their implicit biases, which in turn could enable them
to overcome the negative effects of those biases); Roberts, supra note 126, at 831–32 R
(evaluating proposals to use the IAT to educate jurors about their implicit biases).
248 See Judge Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury
Selection: The Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson,
and Proposed Solutions, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 149, 169 (2010).
249 E.g., Burke, supra note 243, at 1483–84 (“One method of improving prosecutorial R
neutrality during jury selection would be to train prosecutors about the prevalence of
unconscious stereotypes, types of cognitive biases, and the potential distorting effects of
stereotypes and biases on prosecutorial decision making, including neutral jury selection.
Some psychological research suggests that self-awareness of cognitive limitations can
improve the quality of individual decision making.”).
250 The Honorable Judge Mark W. Bennett Biography, Judges Information, UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT, NORTHERN DISTRICT OF IOWA, http://www.iand.uscourts.gov/e-
web/home.nsf/65944fcb56773c56862573a30055c4f3/17a5762715fa4c52862573c900790
72c?OpenDocument (last visited Mar. 9, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/JZ72-LAGL.
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sions based on personal likes or dislikes, generalizations, gut feelings,
prejudices, sympathies, stereotypes, or biases.”251 Addressing similar con-
cerns, the American Bar Association recently passed a resolution calling for
state and other governments to take legislative action that would require
courts in any criminal trial, upon the request of a party, to give an instruction
to the jury that it shall not let bias based on sexual orientation or gender
identity influence its decision.252
Judge Bennett writes that many of his colleagues resist his suggested
reforms, “fearing that implicit biases will only be exacerbated if we call
attention to them.”253 As scholars of implicit social cognition and legal com-
mentators have pointed out, the solution is not to pretend that we live in a
post-Will and Grace world in which we have conquered homophobia, but
rather to identify appeals to bias and confront them directly.254 Research sug-
gests that if even a single juror voices “non-prejudiced norms” during delib-
erations, those statements can affect jury deliberations.255 The hope is that—
as time passes—appeals to anti-gay and anti-trans bias will be rejected by
jurors and will fade from litigation.
III. INTERRELATED ISSUES: PROTECTING LGBT JURORS
In a comment in the UCLA Law Review in 1998, Paul Lynd recognized
an “expanding universe of cases with sexual orientation as a relevant [voir
dire] subject,” including hate crimes prosecutions.256 Because disclosures in
voir dire become part of the public record,257 Lynd wrote that, “The pressure
to conceal gay or lesbian sexual orientation would be particularly strong in
states where gay and lesbian sexual conduct remains illegal and in the ma-
jority of states where employment discrimination based on sexual orientation
remains legal.”258
Sixteen years later, the dynamics of the courtroom may be different at
least in some jurisdictions. Lawrence v. Texas has reduced criminal
stigma,259 and more states protect LGBT citizens with anti-discrimination
251 Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, supra note 126, at 1182–83. R
252 Am. Bar Ass’n, Res. 113A (2013), archived at http://perma.cc/ZJ4M-FH73 (urg-
ing state governments to take legislative action to curtain the “availability and effective-
ness of the ‘gay panic’ and ‘trans panic’ defenses in part by “[r]equiring courts in any
criminal trial or proceeding, upon the request of a party, to instruct the jury not to let bias,
sympathy, prejudice, or public opinion influence its decision about the victims, witnesses,
or defendants based upon sexual orientation or gender identity”).
253 Bennett, supra note 248, at 169. R
254 E.g., Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, supra note 126, at 1184–85. R
255 Lee, The Gay Panic Defense, supra note 31, at 554. R
256 Lynd, supra note 3, at 236–37. R
257 Id. at 268.
258 Id. at 269.
259 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003); cf. Developments in the Law—Sexual Orientation and
the Law, supra note 55, at 1519–37 (discussing the criminalization of same-sex sexual R
activity through sodomy statutes and the stigma they created prior to the invalidation of
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statutes.260 In the increasing number of jurisdictions recognizing same-sex
marriage,261 the mention of a same-sex spouse in voir dire may become in-
creasingly normalized, even routine.262 However, like all LGBT issues, the
risk associated with “outing” prospective jurors in voir dire is highly con-
textual and localized.263
For these reasons, and others that may be more individualized, prospec-
tive jurors who identify as LGBT may continue to feel anxiety in voir dire.264
LGBT identity often is not readily apparent,265 and it is difficult to imagine
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)). But see J. Kelly Strader, Lawrence’s Crimi-
nal Law, 16 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 41, 77–106 (2011) (arguing that even after Lawrence,
courts continue to use a “heterosexual paradigm” to uphold laws criminalizing sexual
activity other than vaginal intercourse).
260 See HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, EQUALITY FROM STATE TO STATE 2013: A RE-
VIEW OF STATE LEGISLATION AFFECTING THE LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANS-
GENDER COMMUNITY AND A LOOK AHEAD IN 2014 12 (2013), archived at http://perma.cc/
6USA-SNVQ (reporting that seventeen states and the District of Columbia prohibit dis-
crimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity and that four states prohibit
discrimination based on sexual orientation only).
261 See Erik Eckholm, Push Expands for Legalizing Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 12, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/13/us/advocates-of-gay-marriage-ex-
tend-their-campaign.html?_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/K24V-RP8Q (describing
victories in the November 2012 elections, which increased the total number of states
recognizing same-sex marriage to nine plus the District of Columbia).
262 Brower describes how increased “visibility and normalization of minority sexual-
ity,” as well as “growing acceptance of civil partnerships or marriage for same-sex
couples and increasing numbers of same-sex families rearing children,” may result in
younger prospective LGBT jurors “anticipat[ing] that voir dire, jury service, and other
associated processes will describe and reflect their relationships accurately.” Brower,
Treatment of Lesbians and Gay Men in Jury Service, supra note 19, at 700–01. He also R
writes that, as more jurisdictions recognize same-sex couples’ relationships through mar-
riage or other legal arrangements, “those couples’ relationships take on a different socie-
tal and legal character, which should be recognized on voir dire and during jury service.”
Id. at 693.
263 See Vanessa H. Eisemann, Striking a Balance of Fairness: Sexual Orientation and
Voir Dire, 13 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 23 (2001) (“Consider a closeted gay, lesbian, or
bisexual person living in a rural environment with a small population. Being forced to
admit that [sic] his or her sexual orientation in a closed hearing could subject that person
to a host of negative consequences. Even having to admit that she or he is a member of an
organization that advocates gay rights or that she or he has contributed money to a gay
rights organization may incite suspicion. In a sparsely populated area where venire mem-
bers, attorneys, and the judge may know each other, the local newspapers would not be
needed for such information to quickly become public.”); cf. Kirk Johnson, Gay Couples
Face a Mixed Geography of Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2013), http://www.nytimes.
com/2013/02/27/us/state-laws-on-gay-marriage-lead-to-disparities.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/TK95-REY4 (describing stark differences in rights that exist for same-sex
couples in Washington and Idaho, states that share a border).
264 See Brower, Treatment of Lesbians and Gay Men in Jury Service, supra note 19, at R
682–83 (“[G]ay persons must deliberately decide what to say or do and how much to
disclose or allow to remain unspoken.”); see also Todd Brower, Multistable Figures:
Sexual Orientation Visibility and Its Effects on the Experiences of Sexual Minorities in
the Courts, 27 PACE L. REV. 141, 177, 197–98 (2007); Todd Brower, Obstacle Courts:
Results of Two Studies on Sexual Orientation Fairness in the California Courts, 11 AM.
U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 39, 53–61 (2002).
265 Brower, Treatment of Lesbians and Gay Men in Jury Service, supra note 19, at R
680 (“Most sexual minorities are not identifiable visually, by accent, or surname.”).
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circumstances in which it would be appropriate for the court or advocates to
inquire about venirepersons’ sexual orientation directly.266 However, LGBT
identity may be disclosed by jurors in response to questioning.267 Commenta-
tors have noted that even routine voir dire questions about personal and do-
mestic relationships might cause awkwardness, either because these
questions fail to account for same-sex relationships, or because they “out”
LGBT jurors in hostile settings.268 Updated questionnaires and courtroom
practices can alleviate those problems significantly.269 Nonetheless, inquiries
focusing on attitudes toward LGBT issues as opposed to identity—the kinds
of questions discussed in Parts I and II of this paper270—also might “out”
gay jurors.271
In The Gay Panic Defense, Lee wrote that, although attitudes about
same-sex sexuality might vary greatly across regions, she preferred not to
propose rules about gay panic defenses that varied based on the jurisdic-
tion.272 Unlike the type of law reform discussed in Lee’s article, jury voir dire
is an inherently localized enterprise. In addition to having local rules about
voir dire itself,273 jurisdictions have different prevailing attitudes toward
266 See id. at 680–88 (describing how LGBT jurors report feeling like they are com-
pelled to “come out” in voir dire, and that some state that advocates asked them directly
about their sexual orientation in open court; arguing that such voir dire practices rob
jurors of the choice to reveal their sexual orientation); cf. Russell K. Robinson, Masculin-
ity as Prison: Sexual Identity, Race, and Incarceration, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1309, 1312,
1383–90 (2011) (arguing that the requirement that inmates must “come out” as gay dur-
ing the initial intake process and prove their gay identity to deputies to qualify for admis-
sion to the Los Angeles County Jail gay-dedicated K6G unit violates the constitutional
right to privacy and forces important decisions that should be left to the individual).
267 See Lynd, supra note 3, at 243–47 (noting that strikes against LGBT jurors are R
more difficult because “lesbians and gay men are not readily identifiable,” but also
describing how defense counsel in the Dan White trial, although prohibited from ques-
tioning jurors directly about their sexual orientation, questioned jurors “indirectly,” using
queries like, “Have you supported controversial causes, say homosexual rights, for
instance?”).
268 See Brower, Treatment of Lesbians and Gay Men in Jury Service, supra note 19, at R
686, 689, 691. Brower notes that, “Standard voir dire questions on marital status may
render minority sexual orientation so invisible during jury service that often lawyers and
judges do not even realize how those questions affect the venire panel and the court, or
how inattentive traditional inquiries are to the diversity of lesbian and gay court users’
lives.” Id. at 689. He also describes how “many persons remain hidden [due to] fear of
negative consequences after disclosing their sexuality,” such as discrimination. Id. at
685.
269 See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., CALIFORNIA JURY QUESTIONNAIRE FOR CIVIL
CASES (2004), archived at http://perma.cc/US72-HLSP (defining “significant personal
relationship” as “a former spouse, domestic partner, life partner, or anyone with whom
you have an influential or intimate relationship that you would characterize as impor-
tant,” and stating that jurors may indicate if they would prefer not to discuss something in
open court); see also State v. Abernathy, 715 S.E.2d 48, 55 (Ga. 2011) (concluding that
the trial court’s individual voir dire of jurors regarding attitudes toward homosexuality in
a separate conference room did not violate the defendant’s right to a public trial).
270 See supra Parts I, II.
271 See Lynd, supra note 3, at 246–47. R
272 Lee, The Gay Panic Defense, supra note 31, at 555. R
273 See Comiskey, supra note 54, at 742. R
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same-sex marriage issues274 and uneven levels of anti-discrimination protec-
tion for LGBT people.275 Voir dire for anti-gay bias may be more important
in some regions than others. Questions that may be perfectly safe for LGBT
venirepersons in New England may make LGBT jurors uncomfortable in
other parts of the country. Because this is such a culturally contested area,
local context remains key to effective voir dire.
In 2014, it may seem non-controversial that LGBT identity alone
should not constitute grounds for a challenge for cause (although jury dis-
crimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges based on sexual orien-
tation remains legal in many jurisdictions276 and supporters of Proposition 8
did argue unsuccessfully that former U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California Chief Judge Vaughn Walker should have recused him-
self based on his sexual orientation277). Only a few decades ago, LGBT ju-
rors were even more vulnerable to challenges. In his 1998 comment, Lynd
discussed several notorious cases in which LGBT venirepersons were re-
moved on the basis of sexual orientation alone,278 including most famously
in Dan White’s 1979 trial for the killing of Harvey Milk, the first openly gay
member of the San Francisco Board of Supervisors.279
Lynd also chronicles, however, the New York City Criminal Court deci-
sion the following year in People v. Viggiani, in which Judge S. Herman
Klarsfeld refused to permit a gay juror to be removed for cause in a case in
which the defendant was charged with gay-bashing.280 Judge Klarsfeld
wrote, “To say that this entire group of citizens who may be otherwise quali-
fied, would be unable to sit as impartial jurors in this case, merely because
of their homosexuality is tantamount to a denial of equal protection under
the U.S. Constitution.”281 Judge Klarsfeld’s opinion tells us, “The prospec-
tive juror disclosed in open court that he socialized and worked with homo-
sexuals and out of the presence of other prospective jurors, he stated that he
had homosexual experiences.”282 The tone of the exchange in Viggiani seems
274 See FLORES & BARCLAY, supra note 196, at 3 (concluding that, in 2012, a 31% R
difference existed between the jurisdiction with the lowest level of support of same-sex
marriage and the highest level; support of same-sex marriage ranged from a high of 62%
in the District of Columbia—closely followed by 57% in Massachusetts and Connecti-
cut—to a low of 31% in Louisiana and Arkansas).
275 See HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, STATEWIDE EMPLOYMENT LAWS AND POLICIES,
supra note 25. R
276 Birkey, supra note 29. R
277 Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1095–96 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Chief Judge Walker
had no obligation to recuse himself . . . or to disclose any potential conflict . . . . [T]he
fact that a judge ‘could be affected by the outcome of a proceeding[,] in the same way
that other members of the general public would be affected, is not a basis for either
recusal or disqualification . . . .’” (second bracket in original) (citations omitted)).
278 E.g., Lynd, supra note 3, at 251–53. R
279 Id. at 232, 246–47.
280 431 N.Y.S.2d 979, 982 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1980); Lynd, supra note 3, at 273–74. R
281 Viggiani, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 982.
282 Id. at 980.
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light years away from a world in which same-sex wedding announcements
appear virtually every Sunday in the New York Times.
Peremptory challenges against LGBT jurors remain legal in most U.S.
jurisdictions,283 although they are now the target of critical commentary,284
litigation challenges,285 and legislative reform efforts.286 At the writing of this
paper, however, California bars peremptory challenges based on sexual ori-
entation,287 and the Ninth Circuit has issued a panel decision forbidding dis-
283 Birkey, supra note 29. R
284 See, e.g., Kathryn Ann Barry, Striking Back Against Homophobia: Prohibiting
Peremptory Strikes Based on Sexual Orientation, 16 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 157,
157–58 (2001) (“In order to achieve justice, the legal system must prevent attorneys from
using inappropriate characteristics, such as sexual orientation, to exclude members of
sexual minorities from juries.”); Eisemann, supra note 263, at 26 (“Sexual orientation R
should be treated like race, religion, ethnicity, and gender for the purposes of voir dire.”);
John J. Neal, Striking Batson Gold at the End of the Rainbow?: Revisiting Batson v.
Kentucky and Its Progeny in Light of Romer v. Evans and Lawrence v. Texas, 91 IOWA
L. REV. 1091, 1094–95, 1113–15 (2006) (arguing that the use of peremptory challenges
against gay and lesbian jurors on the basis of their sexual orientation violates equal pro-
tection and due process, as well as privacy interests).
285 E.g., SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 474 (9th Cir.
2014) (holding that “equal protection prohibits peremptory strikes based on sexual
orientation”).
286 Proposed federal legislation “to prohibit the exclusion of individuals from service
on a Federal jury on account of sexual orientation or gender identity”—the Jury ACCESS
Act and the Juror Non-Discrimination Act of 2013—was introduced in Congress in 2012
and 2013. Jury ACCESS Act, S. 3618, 113th Cong. (2012); Juror Non-Discrimination
Act, H.R. 312, 113th Cong. (2013). So far the bills have not left committee. See S. 38:
Jury ACCESS Act, GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/
s38#overview (last visited Mar. 11, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/9DMS-6YUK;
H.R. 312: Juror Non-Discrimination Act of 2013, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/
congress/bills/113/hr312 (last visited Mar. 11, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/BKD8-
ZDSE. The Department of Justice currently forbids its attorneys from exercising peremp-
tory strikes based on sexual orientation. See Supplemental Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee and
Cross-Appellant SmithKline Beecham Corp. Opposing Rehearing En Banc, SmithKline
Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., Nos. 11-17357, 11-17373 (9th Cir. Apr. 17, 2014), http:/
/cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/general/2014/04/17/11-
17357%20Smithkline%20Supp%20Brief.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/HSB9-HSWP.
287 In California, discrimination in jury selection was first prohibited through case
law, and then by statutory amendment. See People v. Garcia, 77 Cal. App. 4th 1269,
1280–81 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (concluding that gays and lesbians “cannot be discrimi-
nated against in jury selection” and reasoning, “No one should be ‘outed’ in order to take
part in the civic enterprise which is jury duty. . . . That being the case, no one should be
allowed to inquire about it.”); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 231.5 (West 2006) (“A party may
not use a peremptory challenge to remove a prospective juror on the basis of an assump-
tion that the prospective juror is biased merely because of his or her race, color, religion,
sex, national origin, sexual orientation, or similar grounds.”); see also Johnson v. Camp-
bell, 92 F.3d 951, 951 (9th Cir. 1996) (assuming without deciding that sexual orientation
is a protected category under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)); Williams v. Har-
rington, No. CV 09-08774 R(SS), 2011 WL 4055773, at *7–9 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2011)
(concluding that the state court’s denial of a Batson/Wheeler violation arising from per-
emptory strikes allegedly based on sexual orientation was not unreasonable; assuming a
federal constitutional violation, but finding an insufficient record to demonstrate a prima
facie case of discrimination based on sexual orientation); People v. Zuniga, No.
H022931, 2002 WL 31054113, at *1–7 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 16, 2002) (concluding that
the trial court did not err in denying a Batson/Wheeler motion in a homicide case in
which the defendant was a gay man; the challenged strike involved a prospective juror
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crimination on the basis of sexual orientation in jury selection.288
Colorado,289 Oregon,290 and Minnesota291 have passed statutory prohibitions
on sexual orientation-based discrimination in jury service, although little de-
cisional law specifically addresses the exercise of peremptory challenges
under these provisions.292 Some courts have declined to extend Batson v.
Kentucky293 to prohibit peremptory strikes based on sexual orientation.294
One federal district court acknowledged California precedent barring per-
emptory strikes based on sexual orientation, but found no equal protection
violation when a prosecutor stated expressly that he struck a juror because
the venireperson was “a cross-dresser or transvestite.”295
who was a gay man who said that he was sensitive to bias and, in light of comments from
other jurors “that were not very positive about gays, he had to keep the ‘bar’ high”).
288 SmithKline Beecham Corp., 740 F.3d at 474. As this Article went to press, the
Ninth Circuit sua sponte called for briefing on whether review en banc of the panel
decision in SmithKline Beecham was warranted. Order Requesting “Simultaneous Briefs,
SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., No. 11-17357, (9th Cir. Mar. 27, 2014),
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/general/2014/03/27/11-17357_order_requesting_si-
multaneous_briefs.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/3RTC-T8UN.
289 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-71-104(3)(a) (2014) (“No person shall be exempted or
excluded from serving as a trial or grand juror because of race, color, religion, sex, sexual
orientation, marital status, national origin, ancestry, economic status, or occupation.”).
290 OR. REV. STAT. § 10.030(1) (2013) (“Except as otherwise specifically provided
by statute, the opportunity for jury service may not be denied or limited on the basis of
race, religion, sex, sexual orientation, national origin, age, income, occupation or any
other factor that discriminates against a cognizable group in this state.”).
291 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 593.32 (2013) (“A citizen shall not be excluded from jury
service in this state on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, economic
status, marital status, sexual orientation, or a physical or sensory disability.”).
292 See Shmuel Bushwick, Excluding Gay Jurors After Windsor, AMERICAN BAR AS-
SOCIATION LGBT LITIGATOR (Nov. 7, 2013), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/com-
mittees/lgbt/articles/fall2013-1113-excluding-gay-jurors-after-windsor.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/AJ3J-ANK3 (noting that Colorado, Minnesota, and Oregon have statutes
that prohibit sexual orientation discrimination in jury selection, but noting that “[t]he
case law interpreting the intersection of these protections and Batson challenges remains
limited”). Legislation was also recently introduced in West Virginia to ban discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation in jury service. W. Va. House Bill Bars Excluding Gays
From Juries, W. VA. GAZETTE (Apr. 10, 2013), http://www.wvgazette.com/News/
201304100180, archived at http://perma.cc/8HZL-RPWH.
293 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) ([T]he Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to
challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race or on the assumption that black
jurors as a group will be unable impartially to consider the State’s case against a black
defendant.”).
294 E.g., United States v. Ehrmann, 421 F.3d 774, 781–82 (8th Cir. 2005) (“Although
the California Supreme Court has held sexual orientation should be a protected class for
jury selection purposes . . . and the Ninth Circuit has assumed, without deciding, sexual
orientation qualifies as a Batson classification . . . neither the United States Supreme
Court nor this circuit has so held. While we seriously doubt Batson and its progeny
extend federal constitutional protection to a venire panel member’s sexual orientation, our
review of the trial record persuades us that even if Ehrmann made a prima facie case of
purposeful discrimination, his Batson objection fails because the government offered le-
gitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for striking the panel member.” (citations omitted));
United States v. Blaylock, 421 F.3d 758, 769 (8th Cir. 2005) (Ehrmann co-defendant;
same).
295 Carter v. Duncan, No. C 02-0586SBA(PR), 2005 WL 2373572, at *5, *8, *17–18
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2005) (concluding that the appellate court’s rejection of the prisoner’s
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A panel of the Ninth Circuit recently addressed the issue in SmithKline
Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Laboratories.296 In that case, which involved al-
leged antitrust and unfair trade practices claims concerning the pricing of
anti-HIV drugs, “Abbott used its first peremptory strike against the only
self-identified gay member of the venire.”297 GlaxoSmithKlein (GSK) chal-
lenged Abbott Labs’ (Abbott) exercise of a peremptory strike, claiming that
Abbott had struck a gay prospective juror based on his sexual orientation,
and that this violated equal protection under Batson.298 The district court first
stated that it did not know whether Batson applied in civil cases (it does),
then questioned whether Batson applied to sexual orientation, and then said
(incorrectly) that a Batson challenge could not be made without demonstrat-
ing a pattern of discriminatory strikes.299 The district court gave Abbott an
opportunity to provide a rationale for the peremptory strike.300 Counsel for
Abbott responded that he did not know the juror was gay.301 Although the
prospective juror’s sexual orientation was not made express in the record, he
referred during voir dire to his “partner,” using male pronouns.302 The dis-
trict court denied GSK’s motion.303 After a mixed verdict, GSK cross-ap-
pealed, contending that Abbott’s use of a peremptory strike on the basis of
sexual orientation was unconstitutional.304
A panel of the Ninth Circuit concluded that the exercise of peremptory
strikes based on sexual orientation violated equal protection.305 Relying on
the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Windsor, the court concluded that
heightened scrutiny applies to classifications based on sexual orientation.306
The Ninth Circuit then reasoned that Batson protections should be extended
to gays and lesbians, explaining that, “[P]ermitting a strike based on sexual
orientation would send the false message that gays and lesbians could not be
claim that the peremptory strikes at issue violated equal protection was not contrary to, or
an unreasonable application of, federal law because “[t]he prosecutor did not say he was
challenging Lewis because of his sexual orientation, but because Lewis was a ‘cross-
dresser or a transvestite,’” and reasoning that, “[n]o case has yet recognized cross-dress-
ers as a cognizable group,” and that “[t]he way individuals present themselves in terms
of dress, jewelry, hairstyle, and conventional or unconventional behavior may be legiti-
mate clues as to their views and their ability to interact with others”).
296 SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 474 (9th Cir. 2014);
see Ben Adlin, Homosexual Jurors’ Rights under Review: 9th Circuit Will Consider
Whether Jurors Can Be Dismissed for Being Gay, L.A. DAILY J., Nov. 19, 2012, at 1;
Adam Liptak, Court to Decide if Lawyers Can Block Gays From Juries, N.Y. TIMES (July
29, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/30/us/court-weighs-exclusion-of-jurors-be-
cause-theyre-gay.html, archived at http://perma.cc/XJ8W-78MV.
297 SmithKline Beecham Corp., 740 F.3d at 474.
298 Id.
299 Id. at 475; id. at 476 (“[T]he district judge applied the wrong legal standard in
evaluating the Batson claim.”).
300 Id. at 475.
301 Id.
302 Id. at 474.
303 Id.
304 Id. at 475.
305 Id. at 474.
306 Id. at 483.
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trusted to reason fairly on issues of great import to the community or the
nation.”307 Stating that “Windsor’s reasoning reinforces the constitutional ur-
gency of ensuring that individuals are not excluded from our most funda-
mental institutions because of their sexual orientation,” the court explained
that jury service “gives gay and lesbian individuals a means of articulating
their values and a voice in resolving controversies that affect their lives as
well as the lives of all others.”308
Although a comprehensive equal protection analysis is beyond the
scope of this Article, the reasoning of Windsor does seem to reinforce the
rationale for extending Batson to sexual orientation and transgender status.
The majority opinion authored by Justice Kennedy makes clear that due pro-
cess and equal protection bar governmental differentiations affecting a “po-
litically unpopular group”309 that have no purpose other than to “degrade or
demean”310 that group, divest it of “duties and responsibilities,”311 or “im-
pose inequality”312 and express “improper animus.”313 While Batson focused
on purposeful discrimination based on race,314 its predecessor case, Swain v.
Alabama, stated that “the constitutional command forbidding intentional ex-
clusion” from jury service was not limited to African Americans, but “ap-
plies to any identifiable group in the community which may be the subject of
prejudice.”315 Batson was extended to bar peremptory strikes based on gen-
der because women had suffered a history of past discrimination, and be-
cause gender-based challenges were based on “outdated misconceptions”316
and invidious stereotypes that harm individuals and communities.317 Peremp-
tory strikes based on sexual orientation and transgender status should be
prohibited for the same reasons. While the Batson framework itself can be
criticized for failing to root out bias by advocates,318 extending Batson’s ad-
307 Id. at 486.
308 Id. at 485.
309 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (quoting U.S. Dep’t of
Agric. v. Moreno, 412 U.S. 528, 534–35 (1973) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
310 Id. at 2695.
311 Id.
312 Id. at 2694.
313 Id. at 2693.
314 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 94–95 (1986).
315 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 204–05 (1965) (citing Hernandez v. Texas, 347
U.S. 475 (1954)). Hernandez barred discrimination in jury service against Texans of
Mexican descent in part based on a history of discrimination in that state. 347 U.S. at
477–82. The Hernandez Court explained, “community prejudices are not static, and from
time to time other differences from the community norm may define other groups which
need the same protection.” Id. at 478.
316 J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 135 (1994) (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190, 198–99 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
317 Id. at 130–31, 135–36, 139–40; id. at 140 (“The community is harmed by the
State’s participation in perpetuation of invidious group stereotypes and the inevitable loss
of confidence in our judicial system that state-sanctioned discrimination in the courtroom
engenders.”).
318 Bennett, supra note 248, at 161–62 (“Although Batson and its progeny purport- R
edly prohibit striking members of a protected class on account of class membership
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mittedly limited protections to sexual orientation and gender identity would
still perform an important “expressive function.”319
Extending Batson-type protections to LGBT venire members may raise
some practical issues. Unlike race, a prospective juror’s sexual orientation
and transgender status are not listed on the jury questionnaire. In some situa-
tions, this has created threshold questions about whether a juror is a member
of a protected category and whether a juror is being discriminated against
because of a perception that the juror is LGBT. For example, in Common-
wealth v. Smith, a 2008 Massachusetts case, the prosecutor attempted to
challenge a juror for cause on the grounds that the juror had some “identifi-
cation issues.”320 The prosecutor described the juror as a person who
“seemed to be a man dressed as a woman, and [who] appeared to have
breasts.”321 The defense attorney replied, “I see a man who maybe at best I
would argue might be homosexual.”322 He continued, “And if the Common-
wealth’s intention is to challenge on the homosexuals . . . . ,” implying that if
this was the case the challenge for cause should be denied.323 The trial court
denied the prosecutor’s challenge for cause.324
The Commonwealth then made a peremptory challenge to the
venireperson,325 which the defense challenged:
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your Honor, I’d like to put on the record
that I’m beginning to see a pattern on the basis of the Common-
wealth with the exclusion of a homosexual, white male. So I want
to put that on the record as well.
THE JUDGE: Okay. You’ve put it on the record.
DEFENSE COUNSEL: For the Court’s consideration. Thank you.
THE PROSECUTOR: Just so I may be crystal clear, there’s abso-
lutely no pattern. I don’t even know of any even [sic] homosexu-
als that have been before us.
This particular gentleman was dressed, in my opinion, like a
female and he has breasts and so forth. And, frankly, I was just
looking at this from a common sense point of view.
This guy has a lot of identification issues, and I don’t—326
alone, this limitation is easily circumvented if the prosecutor proffers a facially class-
neutral justification and the defendant cannot establish purposeful discrimination to the
court’s satisfaction.”); Anthony Page, Batson’s Blind-Spot: Unconscious Stereotyping
and the Peremptory Challenge, 85 B.U. L. REV. 155, 178–79 (2005).
319 See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
2021, 2024 (1996) (describing the expressive function of law as “the function of law in
‘making statements’ as opposed to controlling behavior directly”).
320 Commonwealth v. Smith, 879 N.E.2d 87, 95 (Mass. 2008) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
321 Id.
322 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
323 Id.
324 Id.
325 Id.
326 Id. at 96–97 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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The trial court upheld the state’s peremptory challenge, explaining that,
“You have a right to present a challenge. You can challenge a person for any
reason, as long as it’s not illegal. It’s very simply put.”327
The defendant was convicted of first-degree murder in a case that did
not ostensibly involve any LGBT issues.328 He appealed the trial court’s rul-
ing on this peremptory challenge.329 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court (SJC) acknowledged that it had not yet “considered the question
whether the exercise of a peremptory challenge to remove a juror because of
his or her sexual orientation or because the juror was transgendered would
violate the guarantees of art. 12 [of the Massachusetts Declaration of
Rights] or the equal protection clause.”330 However, the court did not decide
the question because it concluded that the “record does not supply the neces-
sary factual foundation.”331
The SJC concluded that the record reflected “confusion” about the pro-
spective juror’s membership in a protected category.332 It explained:
Defense counsel appeared to object to the prosecutor’s supposed
use of a peremptory challenge to remove the juror on the basis of
homosexuality, while the prosecutor seemed clearly to focus on
what he perceived to be the transgendered appearance of the juror.
None of the judge’s comments offers additional insights about the
juror, and thus we have no information about the juror’s sex or
transgendered status beyond the superficial observation that the ju-
ror appeared, at least to one person, to be a man with breasts,
dressed as a woman. The juror did not identify himself as homo-
sexual, and there was no evidence offered from any other sources
on this issue.333
As a result of this ambiguity in the record, the court did not reach the ques-
tion of whether the state’s exercise of a peremptory strike violated this pro-
spective juror’s rights.334
327 Id. at 96.
328 Id. at 90.
329 Id.
330 Id. at 96; see also Peter W. Agnes, Jr., Peremptory Challenges in Massachusetts:
Guidelines to Enable the Bench and Bar to Comply with Constitutional Requirements, 94
MASS. L. REV. 81, 96 (2012) (“The SJC has not decided whether a peremptory challenge
may be used to exclude a prospective juror on the basis of sexual orientation or status as a
transgendered person.”).
331 Smith, 879 N.E.2d at 96.
332 Id.
333 Id.
334 Id. at 97 (“[G]iven the factual uncertainty in this case about what, if any, discrete
‘grouping’ the juror might fit into, it was not error for the judge to fail to [address the
issue sua sponte] . . . . The factual ambiguity surrounding the juror’s sex, transgendered
status, and sexual orientation, as well as the motive or reason for the prosecutor’s chal-
lenge, combined with the absence of an objection from defense counsel when the chal-
lenge was made, impeded the trial judge’s ability to draw an inference that purposeful
discrimination had occurred.”); cf. Sneed v. Fla. Dep’t of Corrs., 496 F. App’x 20, 27
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Smith illustrates the complexities of protecting queer and trans prospec-
tive jurors through traditional means in the court system.335 While a juror’s
sexual orientation or transgender status in fact may be a reason that he or she
suffers discrimination, it may not be manifest to observers or stated in the
record.336 For these reasons, the Batson framework—as well as other reform
measures suggested in the context of race, such as keeping statistics337—may
be difficult to administer in the context of LGBT venirepersons.
It is in part for this reason that some commentators call for the abolition
of peremptory challenges.338 Two U.S. Supreme Court Justices have advo-
(11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (rejecting the prisoner’s ineffective assistance of counsel
(IAC) claim, which alleged that the attorney had failed to object to the use of peremptory
challenges against gay jurors, explaining that “Sneed has presented no evidence concern-
ing the sexual orientation of the members of the jury pool or the petit jury,” and conclud-
ing that his IAC claim failed in part because “he did not demonstrate that homosexuals
were underrepresented”).
335 Since Smith was decided in 2008, Massachusetts has passed an important anti-
discrimination protection for transgender people, “An Act Relative to Gender Identity,”
which protects against discrimination on the basis of gender identity in employment,
housing, credit, public education, and under hate crimes provisions. See 2011 Mass. Acts
866; Press Release, Office of the Governor, Governor Patrick Signs Transgender Equal
Rights Bill (Nov. 23, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/4KYD-H4DZ. Although the act
does not definitively answer the questions relating to peremptory challenges presented in
Smith, it could raise awareness and change actors’ behavior. Judicial organizations have
advocated for public education for members of the bar and bench, as well as court per-
sonnel. See, e.g., JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, SEXUAL ORIENTATION FAIRNESS IN
THE CALIFORNIA COURTS:  FINAL REPORT OF THE SEXUAL ORIENTATION FAIRNESS SUB-
COMMITTEE OF THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL’S ACCESS AND FAIRNESS ADVISORY COMMITTEE
41–42 (2001), archived at http://perma.cc/QK95-7KK2 (making recommendations and
referrals to the Center for Judicial Education and Research).
336 See People v. Bell, 151 P.3d 301, 304 (Cal. 2007). A murder defendant claimed
that the prosecution violated California Batson/Wheeler doctrine by exercising peremp-
tory challenges based on race and sexual orientation. Id. at 295, 300. While the jurors’
racial identities were in the record, there was no record of sexual orientation of the two
prospective jurors. Id. at 304. The defense challenge was described as follows:
[D]efense counsel claimed the prosecutor had exercised group bias against lesbi-
ans in peremptorily challenging Prospective Jurors [F.B.] and [L.W.]. Asked for
the factual basis to believe [F.B.] was a lesbian, counsel pointed to “her physical
appearance” and the fact she had participated in a gay rights march, “is involved
with other feminist issues and reads women’s literature.” In the case of [L.W.],
counsel pointed to her “non-traditional job” (as a carpenter and locksmith) and
that she “reads women’s issues.”
Id. at 301.
337 See Burke, supra note 243, at 1485–86 (“Another method of identifying and neu- R
tralizing bias during the peremptory challenge process would be to collect and publish
both individual and office-wide data regarding the exercise of peremptory challenges.”).
338 Maisa Jean Frank, Note, Challenging Peremptories: Suggested Reforms to the
Jury Selection Process Using Minnesota as a Case Study, 94 MINN. L. REV. 2075, 2077
(2010) (describing possible reforms of peremptory challenges, including barring the use
of peremptories on the basis of an expanded category of protected groups, and eliminat-
ing peremptory challenges entirely); Kathryne M. Young, Outing Batson: How the Case
of Gay Jurors Reveals the Shortcomings of Modern Voir Dire, 48 WILLAMETTE L. REV.
243, 245–46 (2011) (recognizing challenges to applying Batson doctrine to gay identity,
and suggesting instead the elimination or reduction in number of peremptory challenges).
But see Jeffrey Bellin & Junichi P. Semitsu, Widening Batson’s Net to Ensnare More than
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLG\37-2\HLG206.txt unknown Seq: 49 19-MAY-14 10:10
2014] In the Box: Voir Dire on LGBT Issues in Changing Times 455
cated this solution in the context of race-based challenges, largely because
the Batson framework has proven so difficult to police.339 However, elimi-
nating peremptory challenges could be a double-edged sword because, as
discussed in Part II.A., under prevailing tests for challenges for cause, liti-
gants sometimes are forced to remove “explicit-but-fair” homonegative ju-
rors through peremptory challenges.340
In SmithKline Beecham Corp., the Ninth Circuit was careful to note that
“prudent courtroom procedure” can overcome any administrative challenges
(in addition to concerns about privacy) created by extending Batson to lesbi-
ans and gays.341 To support its conclusion that administrative problems can
be overcome, the court pointed to the California state court system’s “suc-
cessful application of Wheeler [California state constitutional Batson
equivalent] protections”342 to discrimination on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion for the past for thirteen years.343
Codes of judicial conduct and attorney ethics rules also prohibit mani-
festations of bias on the basis of factors including sexual orientation.344 Such
provisions prohibit attorneys from describing prospective jurors in pejorative
ways and require trial judges to take steps to prohibit biased comments and
the Unapologetically Bigoted or Painfully Unimaginative Attorney, 96 CORNELL L. REV.
1075, 1120–29 (2011) (proposing a revised Batson framework that does not require a
finding of purposeful discrimination and cataloguing purportedly race-neutral explana-
tions attorneys have proffered for peremptory challenges).
339 Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 273 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“I believe
it necessary to reconsider Batson’s test and the peremptory challenge system as a
whole.”); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 102–03, 107 (1986) (Marshall, J., concur-
ring) (“The inherent potential of peremptory challenges to distort the jury process by
permitting the exclusion of jurors on racial grounds should ideally lead the Court to ban
them entirely from the criminal justice system.”); see also Liptak, supra note 296 (dis- R
cussing Justices Marshall and Breyer’s views on peremptory challenges).
340 See supra Part II.A.
341 SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 487 (9th Cir. 2014).
342 See People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 761–62 (Cal. 1978).
343 SmithKline Beecham Corp., 740 F.3d at 487.
344 See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.3(B) (2011) (“A judge shall
not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct manifest bias or prejudice,
or engage in harassment, including but not limited to bias, prejudice, or harassment based
upon race, sex, gender, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orienta-
tion, marital status, socioeconomic status, or political affiliation, and shall not permit
court staff, court officials, or others subject to the judge’s direction and control to do
so.”); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(d) cmt. 3 (2013) (“A lawyer who, in the
course of representing a client, knowingly manifests by words or conduct, bias or
prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation
or socioeconomic status violates [this rule] when such actions are prejudicial to the ad-
ministration of justice.”). See generally Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Adjudication According
to Codes of Judicial Conduct, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 67 (2002) (discuss-
ing applicable provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct); Jennifer Gerarda Brown,
Sweeping Reform from Small Rules? Anti-Bias Canons as a Substitute for Heightened
Scrutiny, 85 MINN. L. REV. 363 (2000) (arguing that the Model Code of Judicial Conduct
could provide some protection for gays and lesbians in the absence of heightened scrutiny
under the equal protection clause).
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behavior.345 However, the comment on Rule 8.4 of the Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct states that even a finding that an attorney exercised a per-
emptory challenge on a discriminatory basis will not necessarily mean that
he or she has run afoul of this rule.346
As long as our system utilizes peremptory challenges, advocates should
not be permitted to exercise them based on a juror’s actual or perceived
sexual orientation or transgender status.347 Such a rule would address the
type of situation presented in Smith, where the prosecutor stated expressly
that he was striking the juror because of what he perceived as the venireper-
son’s “identification issues.”348 It should not matter whether the prospective
juror identifies as a transgender woman or a gay man; it is unacceptable for
the state to strike a juror because the prosecutor reads the venireperson as
gender non-conforming or transgender.
CONCLUSION
The U.S. Supreme Court’s June 2013 decisions in Hollingsworth and
Windsor marked a watershed moment for the LGBT rights movement. At
times during the spring of 2013, it seemed that every few days an additional
state349 or country350 recognized same-sex marriage, or another politician an-
nounced her support of marriage equality.351 The issues discussed in this pa-
345 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.3(C) (2011) (“A judge shall require
lawyers in proceedings before the court to refrain from manifesting bias or prejudice, or
engaging in harassment, based upon attributes including but not limited to race, sex,
gender, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation, marital sta-
tus, socioeconomic status, or political affiliation, against parties, witnesses, lawyers, or
others.”).
346 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(d) cmt. 3 (2013) (“A trial judge’s find-
ing that peremptory challenges were exercised on a discriminatory basis does not alone
establish a violation of this rule.”).
347 Anti-discrimination statutes sometimes are written this way for just this reason.
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-81a (2013) (“For the purposes of [certain sexual ori-
entation discrimination statutes], ‘sexual orientation’ means having a preference for het-
erosexuality, homosexuality or bisexuality, having a history of such preference or being
identified with such preference . . . .” (emphasis added)); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B,
§ 3(6) (2012) (protecting individuals from discrimination based on sexual orientation in-
cluding discrimination based on “being identified as” straight, gay, or bisexual).
348 Commonwealth v. Smith, 879 N.E.2d 87, 95–96 (Mass. 2008).
349 Davey, supra note 221; Erik Eckholm, Delaware, Continuing a Trend, Becomes R
the 11th State to Allow Same-Sex Unions, N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2013), http://www.ny-
times.com/2013/05/08/us/delaware-to-allow-same-sex-marriage.html, archived at http://
perma.cc/L7VB-SQAR; Dorothy J. Samuels, Op-Ed., And Then There Were Ten, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 28, 2013, at SR10, archived at http://perma.cc/N7FP-XWZ5 (reporting that
Rhode Island had become the tenth state to approve same-sex marriage).
350 Cassandra Vinograd, Britain Legalizes Gay Marriage, YAHOO NEWS (July 17,
2013), http://news.yahoo.com/britain-legalizes-gay-marriage-133757426.html, archived
at http://perma.cc/G5MY-4F9T.
351 See, e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Hillary Clinton Endorses Same-Sex Marriage,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2013), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/18/hillary-clin-
ton-endorses-same-sex-marriage/, archived at http://perma.cc/7WQP-ZA5F.
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per are in flux, reflecting not only shifting legal regimes, but also rapidly
changing social attitudes.352
Many of the points made in this piece are about managing that change.
More cases involving LGBT issues and sexuality will enter the courts in
coming decades. Lawyers and courts will have to adjust to this reality and
develop effective voir dire techniques. Multiple interrelated and conflicting
issues may surface, including the need to protect the rights and dignity of
LGBT prospective jurors while also identifying anti-LGBT bias. Determin-
ing the best response to these challenges will require a highly contextual and
localized approach.
While much is in transition, this much is certain: jury voir dire is a
unique context in which to observe contested cultural norms, and a particu-
larly intriguing window on public attitudes during a time of rapid social
change. Since Paul Lynd wrote his article fifteen years ago,353 it truly does
appear that a “sea change” in attitudes toward LGBT issues has occurred.354
I hope that this Article will help attorneys and courts navigate voir dire on
this shifting terrain.
352 See Nagourney, supra note 26. R
353 Lynd, supra note 3. R
354 See Windsor Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 217, at 105–06 (argument R
exchange between attorney Roberta Kaplan and Justice Scalia); Harwood, supra note 128 R
(reporting “sea change” in attitudes toward LGBT issues in just fifty years).
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